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INNOVATION WARFARE
Jeanne Suchodolski, Suzanne Harrison, & Bowman Heiden*
Innovation, in particular, technology-based innovation, is the
key driver for both economic competitiveness and national security.
Other nations, with interests adverse to the United States, recognize
this fact. In an increasingly interconnected world, nation states seek
to accumulate innovation prowess, and hence economic strength as
a key element of their geopolitical power. Improving the living
conditions of one’s citizens is a justifiable and laudable goal.
However, especially savvy nation states, such as China, also pursue
such ends as a mechanism to influence or diminish the national
security and geopolitical power of the United States. These actions
also threaten the post-WWII liberal economic order and worldwide
peace and security. There is no need to inflict upon the world the
carnage of war if geopolitical aims can be achieved via alternative
competitive means.
This particular form of competitive strategy pursued by adversarial
nation states and the targeting of America’s innovation ecosystem can
be labeled: “Innovation Warfare.” Innovation Warfare is further
defined as an executable doctrine with specific strategic goals and
*
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elements. The articulation of this doctrine is believed to be new and
novel.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................176
II. BACKGROUND .....................................................................180
III. CHINESE ECONOMIC ASCENDENCY AND GEOPOLITICAL
GOALS .................................................................................191
IV. INNOVATION WARFARE EXPLAINED .................................195
V. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. INNOVATION
WARFARE COUNTERSTRATEGY.........................................205
VI. CRAFTING AN INNOVATION WARFARE
COUNTERSTRATEGY...........................................................214
VII. THE ELEMENTS OF AN INNOVATION WARFARE
COUNTERSTRATEGY...........................................................216
A. Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Identify
Possible Technological Future(s) and Drive Towards the
Preferred Technological Future(s) ...............................216
B. Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and Scope
Federal R&D Spending to Seed the Innovations
Necessary to Attain the Preferred Future .....................227
C. Secure Technology Control Position – Intellectual
Property as an Armament of Innovation Warfare ........235
D. Organize to Win ............................................................247
VIII. CONCLUSION .....................................................................255

I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation, in particular, technology-based innovation, is the
key driver for both economic competitiveness and national security.
Other nations, with interests adverse to the United States, recognize
this fact. In an increasingly interconnected world, nation states seek
to accumulate innovation prowess, and hence economic strength, as
a key element of their geopolitical power. Especially savvy nation
states also pursue such ends as a mechanism to influence or diminish
the national security and geopolitical power of the United States.
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There is no need to inflict upon the world the carnage of war if one’s
geopolitical aims can be achieved via alternative competitive means.
Several authors suggest China’s long-term ambitions include
unseating the United States as the world’s economic and political
leader.1 More compelling than opinions, several United States
(“U.S.”) government and private studies document a systematic and
coordinated effort by China to achieve technical and economic
dominance through misappropriation of U.S. technology.2 These
efforts are additionally supported by a companion effort to weaken
international economic institutions and norms designed to protect
U.S. intellectual property and free trade.3 The Chinese tactics
include illegal means, and sophisticated use of legal means, to

1
See, e.g., JONATHAN D.T. WARD, CHINA’S VISION OF VICTORY 104 (2019);
ROBERT SPALDING & SETH KAUFMAN, STEALTH WAR: HOW CHINA TOOK OVER
WHILE AMERICA’S ELITE SLEPT 12 (2019); GRAHAM ALLISON, DESTINED FOR
WAR: CAN AMERICA AND CHINA ESCAPE THUCYDIDES’S TRAP? 107–32, 152
(2017) [hereinafter ALLISON]; GRAHAM ALLISON ET AL., LEE KUAN YEW: THE
GRANDMASTER’S INSIGHTS ON CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WORLD 16,
42–43 (2013) [hereinafter ALLISON ET AL.].
2
See, e.g., MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET SINGH, DEF. INNOVATION UNIT
EXPERIMENTAL (DIUX), CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: HOW
CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ENABLE A STRATEGIC
COMPETITOR TO ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. INNOVATION 16 (2008),
https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018
_(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/U9MG-YW9X]; SEAN O’CONNER, HOW CHINESE
COMPANIES FACILITATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM THE UNITED STATES
(2019),
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/How%20Chinese%
20Companies%20Facilitate%20Tech%20Transfer%20from%20the%20US.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CMY9-Q7J7].
3
See JIM MATTIS, SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEP’T OF DEFENSE 1–3 (2018),
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/P78Y-UY6S]; see also Colum Lynch,
China Bids to Lead World Agency Protecting Intellectual Property, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Nov. 26, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/26/china-bids-leadworld-intellectual-property-organization-wipo/ [https://perma.cc/8GNZ-WJY3]
(reporting on China’s attempt to head the World Intellectual Property
Organization and quoting one intellectual property expert: “[w]hy would you
want to put the fox in charge of the henhouse?”).
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misappropriate U.S. technology and weaken the U.S. innovation
infrastructure including:
a) Leveraging the open university and laboratory ecosystem via
direct sponsorship and engagement of Chinese nationals;4
b) Devaluing U.S. positions in patents and technology
platforms;5 and
c) Accessing private sector U.S. technology through
acquisitions and ownership stakes in existing firms, funding
of high-tech start-ups, and forced joint ventures and other
contractual agreements as a prerequisite for entering the
Chinese market.6
This particular form of competitive strategy targeting the
innovation ecosystem in the United States is labeled by the Authors
as “Innovation Warfare,”7 and it is defined as an executable
competitive strategy:
a) Reflecting an innovation, intellectual property, and
technology strategy articulated and executed by the state
(e.g. China);
b) Using illegal means, political means, and legal economic
activities—of the type previously residing solely in the
province of commercial enterprise, to achieve the state’s
objectives;
c) Employing these economic and innovation activities to
achieve both economic geopolitical power and to enhance
military capabilities; and
4

BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2.
MATTIS, supra note 3.
6
BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2.
7
The Authors are aware that the term “warfare” can be read narrowly to mean
the use of armed force, actions legally justifying the use of armed force, or actions
taken ancillary to the prosecution of armed conflict. Objections exist to the use of
the term “warfare” in other peacetime contexts, such as, “cyberwar” or
“information warfare.” For reasons further developed throughout this paper, the
Authors nonetheless adopt this term in the context of “Innovation Warfare” to
articulate the existence of an aggressive competitive strategy currently pursued by
adversaries to the United States. This does not imply that pursuit of such
competitive strategies is by itself, legal justification for armed conflict or
intervention.
5
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d) Functioning as a military, national security, and defense
doctrine not solely as a reflection of the state’s economic
policy goals nor commercial competition in the ordinary
course.
Innovation Warfare does not just threaten American jobs and
economic prosperity. By simultaneously co-opting and weakening
the innovation capabilities of the United States, China seeks to
advance its rise to world power. China’s prosecution of Innovation
Warfare not only encompasses a rejection of a rules-based
international order, but also poses an existential threat. A world
where China dominates the technology landscape is not just about
who earns the profits or prevails in an abstract geopolitical fight.
According to the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America (“National Security Strategy”), China pursues a world in
which economies are less free, less fair, and less likely to respect
human dignity and freedoms.8 China’s Innovation Warfare activities
risk the type of economic and geopolitical aggressions that were a
root cause of two World Wars.
America must urgently articulate and execute a defensive
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy. At its core, Innovation Warfare
strategies are about seizing control of the technological future(s),
thereby securing a dominant economic and security position from
which to accomplish other geopolitical aims. In view of that central
observation and the necessity for a coherent response, this Article
proposes a four-step approach to crafting and executing the needed
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy:
1) Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Develop machine
learning tools that identify the possible technological future(s)
and drive towards the preferred future(s);
2) Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and scope
federal research and development (“R&D”) spending to seed
the innovations necessary to attain the preferred future(s);

8

WHITE HOUSE, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 (2017) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-20170905.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDC4-RUCN].
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3) Secure Technology Control Positions – Identify and secure
control positions along the preferred future technology
implementation path, including deploying and protecting
intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation
Warfare battlespace; and
4) Organize to Win – Develop cross-functional capabilities and
inter-organizational coordination both within the government
and across the public-private interface.
The capability to implement the Innovation Warfare
counterstrategy already exists within the Department of Defense and
among key U.S. public and private stakeholders. The missing link is
a strategic plan and organization that brings together these existing
capabilities. Such a plan not only neutralizes the Chinese Innovation
Warfare efforts, but maintains the global technology leadership that
is critical to U.S. national security and economic competitiveness.
The Innovation Warfare counterstrategy defined in this Article
provides this missing link.
The Article’s three major topics describe in greater detail:
innovation ecosystem vulnerabilities and doctrinal concepts; why
existing recommendations, although meritorious, fail to articulate a
coherent response; and new proposals and legal authorities for
counterstrategies and government action. These three major topics
are further subdivided and presented in five sections: a background
describing the criticality of the innovation ecosystem to U.S.
prosperity and security; China’s economic ascent and prosecution of
Innovation Warfare to achieve its geopolitical goals; the need for a
comprehensive U.S. Innovation Warfare counterstrategy; the
specific elements of an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy; and
conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States became the world’s largest economy
following the Civil War.9 The late nineteenth century saw a burst of
9
ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: HISTORICAL STATISTICS 259–61
(2003) (showing the U.S. economy became the world’s largest economy shortly
after 1870).
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innovative technologies that became cornerstones of modern life.10
“Great Inventions” such as the internal-combustion engine, electric
light, electronic communications, and mechanized transportation
fueled explosive growth that utterly transformed and elevated the
standard of living for Americans.11
Just as important as the invention process was the development
of the nation’s industrial infrastructure.12 Concurrent developments
in business organizational design, distribution networks, legal
frameworks, finance, and manufacturing enabled the delivery of
these inventions and their attendant benefits to American society as
new and useful products and services.13 For the purpose of this
Article, “innovation” is defined as the process of converting
inventions into useful products and services, including developing
the infrastructure necessary to do so.14 American proficiency at the
innovation process resulted in a period of economic expansion from
1870 to 1970: a period of a magnitude and duration not previously
witnessed in world history.15
That the United States maintained such a sustained period of
economic growth did not occur by happenstance. From the
beginning, the United States facilitated an egalitarian, rule-based
legal system designed to enable and de-risk the innovation process
regardless of social class.16 While the United States’ economic
10

ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S.
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 1–2 (2016).
11
Id. at 4.
12
Christopher Conte & Albert R. Karr, The U.S. Economy: A Brief History, DEP’T
OF STATE, https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/oecon/chap3.htm [https://perma.cc/ 3UAAVN4X] (last visited Oct. 25. 2020).
13
Id.
14
This broader concept of innovation is the focus, rather than the narrower
concept of technology. Whereas technology refers to scientific knowledge,
innovation encompasses all of society’s means of putting that knowledge into
motion for society’s benefit. Both the technical knowledge and the infrastructure
and activities necessary to utilize that knowledge are relevant to economic growth,
and hence of importance to national security.
15
See GORDON, supra note 10, at 1–20.
16
See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & STEPHEN J. EZELL, INNOVATION ECONOMICS:
THE RACE FOR GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 3–6 (2012).
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history reveals an ongoing struggle to balance laissez-faire, free
market practices, and proactive government regulation, that same
history also reveals a government bias towards action in industrial
innovation policy.17 The United States articulated and executed
specific initiatives that facilitated this growth at pivotal points
throughout the duration of this expansion.
An example of these initiatives includes the Interstate
Commerce Act regulating the transportation sector and ensuring
“just and reasonable” access to this critical element of the nation’s
economic infrastructure.18 Prior to the First World War, the
government formed the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (“NACA”) to coordinate research in the emerging field
of aeronautics and to catch up to technology leaders in Europe.19
When cooperation amongst aviation industry participants
subsequently proved difficult, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Franklin Roosevelt, employed NACA to broker the formation of the
Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association and cross-license necessary
patents.20 During the 1920s, the government employed a similar
tactic when it influenced the formation of RCA Corporation and
patent pools to ensure American competitiveness and prevent
foreign domination of the fledgling radio and electronic
communication industries.21
The United States further strengthened its national research
ecosystem during the 1930s by investing heavily in basic R&D in

17

See Conte & Karr, supra note 12.
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104 §§ 1–2, 24 Stat. 379
(1887).
19
Elizabeth Suckow, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics Overview,
NASA (Apr. 23, 2009), https://history.nasa.gov/naca/overview.html [https://
perma.cc/EER3-BB39].
20
Alex Roland, SP-4103 Model Research – Volume 1, NASA (1985),
https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4103/ch2.htm [https://perma.cc/F6WD-NYD9].
21
PETER J. HUGILL, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SINCE 1844: GEOPOLITICS AND
TECHNOLOGY 121 (1999) (describing the U.S. Navy’s efforts to prevent foreign
domination of American radio communications by ensuring no one company had
sufficient patent rights to a complete system).
18
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anticipation of the coming World War.22 After the war, the
government leveraged its prior investment in wartime research and
embarked on a policy of research in scientific investment as a
cornerstone of the American economy.23 That policy, as outlined in
1945, continued the national laboratory system, created the National
Science Foundation, and established a system of federal research
grants giving rise to the modern university research system.24 That
university research system, in turn, gave birth to modern clusters of
innovation such as Silicon Valley, Boston, and Austin.25
The capabilities inherent in the American innovation ecosystem
as a consequence of these previous efforts made the promise of
landing a man on the moon realistic, even if audacious. The
acquisition of the additional expertise needed to prevail in that race
was essential for national security.26 America’s space program
underwrote the development of many technological advances that
further bolstered the innovation economy.27
Every source of American economic growth can be derived from
the role of innovation and technological change.28 The United States
maintained its position as the world’s largest economy for over 150
22
See GORDON, supra note 10, at 535–65 (arguing what he calls “The Great
Leap,” the period from 1920 to 1950 where the Great Depression masks the
significant investment made in research as well as the rise in wages, fueled a
second round of innovativeness and a recharge of the American economy).
23
Vannevar Bush, Science The Endless Frontier, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF. (July
1945), https://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm [https://perma.cc/3AYEV69Y] (arguing that a continual program of scientific research was essential to the
United States).
24
Id.
25
MARGARET O’MARA, CITIES OF KNOWLEDGE: COLD WAR SCIENCE AND THE
SEARCH FOR THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 71, 74 (2005).
26
Martand Jha, This is How the Space Race Changed the Great Power Rivalry
Forever, NAT’L INT. (July 27, 2017), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-spacerace-changed-the-great-power-rivalry-forever-21690 [https://perma.cc/RMD7-6KV5].
27
Aldo Spadoni, How Technology from the Space Race Changed the World, NOW:
NORTHRUP GRUMMAN (Apr. 9, 2019), https://now.northropgrumman.com/howtechnology-from-the-space-race-changed-the-world/#:~:text=The%20list%20of%20
technology%20from,space%20technology%20research%20and%20development
[https://perma.cc/P93N-EY54].
28
See GORDON, supra note 10, at 569.
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years because of these industrial policies and initiatives.29 The
importance of innovation, and hence of pro-innovation initiatives,
to the creation and sustainment of America’s economic strength is
evident from an examination of objective data.
One measure for evaluating the contribution of innovation to
economic growth is Total Factor Productivity (“TFP”).30 In general,
TFP captures the efficiency with which labor and capital
investments combine to generate economic output.31 Figure 1
depicts the historical averages over time for productivity growth in
the U.S., wherein the contribution of labor is shown in white. The
second component, shown in Figure 1 below, displays “capital
deepening,” which represents the rising capital investment per
worker hour. Capital deepening accounts for things such as
investment in tools and equipment.32 Growth not otherwise
accounted for by labor and capital must arise from some other
economic input. This “residual” contribution is TFP, which is a
proximate measure of the contribution of technology and innovation
to overall productivity and economic growth.33 As seen in Figure 1,

29

Id.
Total Factor Productivity, Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD (Dec. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter OECD], https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3091 [https://
perma.cc/RX24-23BZ]; see also Robert Solow, Technical Change and the
Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. OF ECONS. AND STATIS. 312, 312–20
(1957). Solow won the Nobel Prize for his work defining technological change a key
economic growth factor in addition to influx of capital or improvements in the quality
or supply of labor. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., The Sveriges
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Noel 1987: Robert M.
Solow (Oct. 21, 1987), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1987/
press-release/ [https://perma.cc/PG5L-NH3B]. Subsequent research has criticized the
metric as overly simplistic, but it remains a good proxy for the contribution of
innovation and technological change to economic growth. See also ATKINSON &
EZELL, supra note 16, at 294–95 (2012) (explaining the term’s relation to innovation
and further identifying the limitations of the approach).
31
Roberto Cardarelli & Lusine Lusinyan, U.S. Total Factor Productivity
Slowdown: Evidence from the U.S. States 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper,
WP/15/116, 2015).
32
Id.
33
See GORDON, supra note 10, at 15–16.
30
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America’s post-World War II expansion stemmed from a significant
increase in TFP during the years between 1920 and 1970.

Figure 1. Contribution of TFP, Capital Deepening, and Labor to
Productivity Growth34

Today, the U.S. remains the world’s largest economy, but that
position is under siege.35 The U.S. is losing its leadership in the
highest value-added sectors of economic activity and, with it, those
jobs necessary to maintain the standard of living to which
Americans have become accustomed.36 Erosion of America’s
innovation capacity is one reason for this decline.37 As seen in Figure
2, after 1970, TFP steadily declined to levels not seen since the First
World War.38

34

Id. (showing 2014 as the latest year for which consistent data is available).
See ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 16, at 32–33.
36
See id.
37
Id. at 33.
38
See GORDON, supra note 10, at 547.
35
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Figure 2. Average Percentage Growth in TFP by Decade39

TFP is an imprecise measurement of innovation activity in the
economy. Given the importance of innovation to economic
performance and the coarseness of the TFP measure, modern
researchers have devised alternatives. Two popular innovation
indices are the Cornell Global Innovation Index and the Bloomberg
Innovation Index.40 Each of these indices evaluates the capacity for
innovation-driven growth based on multiple factors, such as the
strength of the institutional framework, human capital and research,
infrastructure, and business and market sophistication.41
These more sophisticated indices also show that the United
States no longer leads the world in innovation.42 Both the 2019 and

39

Id.
See generally CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX
2019 (2019) [hereinafter CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2019], https://www.wipo.int/
edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019.pdf [https:// perma.cc/2EMS-SNEC]; see also
Peter Coy, The Bloomberg Innovation Index, BLOOMBERG (2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-innovative-countries/#:~:text=Bloomberg
%20ranked%20countries%20and%20sovereigns,country%20from%20zero%20to%2
0100 [https://perma.cc/4XFD-78G8].
41
CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2019, supra note 40, at xviii.
42
See id. at xxiv; see also CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION
INDEX 2020 xxii (2020) [hereinafter CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2020],
40
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the 2020 editions of the Cornell Global Innovation Index place the
United States third.43 The most recent Bloomberg Innovation Index,
published in 2019, ranked the United States eighth, rebounding back
into the top ten from even lower rankings in previous years.44
Enhanced competitive capabilities of foreign economies is a
second cause for America’s relative decline.45 That other economies
become strong and raise the standard of living for their citizens need
not be a detriment to the United States. Cordell Hull, the Secretary
of State who led the creation of the post-World War II liberal
international economic order, recognized the linkage between free
trade and peace.46 In his memoir, Hull wrote, “I saw that you could
not separate the idea of commerce from the idea of war and peace
. . . [and] that wars were often largely caused by economic rivalry
conducted unfairly.”47 Hull believed that rebuilding the world’s
economies was key to preventing world wars.48
The combination of post-World War II trade liberalism and
technology made it easier for people, ideas, and goods to move about
the world.49 Slow removal of barriers to trade and investment led to
significant foreign investment and continued worldwide economic
growth in the post-war years.50 As shown in Figure 3, the gross
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2020-report [https://perma.cc/7BNNF3SF]; see also Coy, supra note 40.
43
CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2019, supra note 40, at xxxiv; CORNELL
UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2020, supra note 42 at xxii.
44
Alexandre Tanzi, U.S. and Canada Make Strides in Bloomberg 2019 Innovation
Index, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-01-28/u-s-canada-make-strides-in-bloomberg-2019-innovation-index
[https://perma.cc/VDQ8-796U].
45
See ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 16, at 32.
46
Douglas A. Irwin, Trade Liberalization: Cordell Hull and the Case for
Optimism 5 (Council on Foreign Rels., Working Paper, 2008), https://cdn.cfr.
org/sites/default/files/pdf/2008/07/CGS_WorkingPaper_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/
63M5-WWT8].
47
CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 84 (1948).
48
See Irwin, supra note 46, at 8.
49
Geoffrey Jones, Restoring a Global Economy, 1950-1980, HARVARD BUS.
SCH. (Aug. 22, 2005), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/restoring-a-global-economy19501980 [https://perma.cc/546D-LA8T].
50
Id.
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domestic product (“GDP”) of the United States and many European
countries began to rise during this period with China lagging and
then catching up rapidly.51

Figure 3. Comparison of GDP for Various Nations ($ Current PPP)52

Rising levels of wealth enabled economies to make greater
investments in R&D over time. These investments put competitive
pressure on the American innovation economy as other nations
introduced new and useful products and services. As shown in
Figure 4, the American share of total world spending on R&D
activities has significantly declined from nearly seventy percent in
1960 to only twenty-eight percent in recent years.53 China now
spends nearly as much on R&D as does the United States.54 The
pace at which global R&D spending has increased reflects the

51

See OECD, supra note 30.
Id.
53
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, 2018 CLARION CALL: LAUNCH OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS FRONTIERS 5
(2018), https://www.compete.org/storage/reports/2018%20clarion%20call%20final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/T4U9-VQNK].
54
Id.
52
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knowledge and innovation intensiveness of the escalating economic
competition among nations.55

Figure 4. Proportion of U.S. vs. Worldwide R&D Spending56

Economic competition from other nations, if appropriately
structured, can be a race in which all humanity wins.57 Losing its
position as the world’s largest economy might not impact most
Americans if their standard of living and institutional integrity
remain intact.58 While the government should always be concerned
with strengthening American innovative capacity as a driver of
economic prosperity, maintaining an economic leadership position
has not always been coincident with worldwide political leadership.
In the period spanning from 1870 to just prior to World War II,
America’s isolationist sentiments left it content to cede world
political leadership to Great Britain.59
America’s economic might enabled it to craft a late twentieth
century liberal world order consistent with American values and
ideals, fund a technological arms race with the Soviet Union, and
55

Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
57
See ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 16, at 15.
58
Charles Kenny, America is No. 2! And that’s Great News., WASH. POST: OPS.
(Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-no-2-and-thatsgreat-news/2014/01/17/09c10f50-7c97-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html
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prevail in the Cold War.60 The strength of the American economy
enables continued funding of a military unmatched in its capabilities
and ability to project power overseas.61 The United States now sits
as the global leader in a unipolar world as a consequence of this
economic might.62
Innovation is the critical linchpin and driver of both military
technical superiority and economic competitiveness, as shown in
Figure 5. Deterioration of the American innovation ecosystem
adversely impacts both national security and the economy.

Figure 5. Innovation as a Driver of National Security
and Economic Competitiveness

Deterioration of the American innovation ecosystem also
adversely impacts the nation’s ability to exercise international
leadership. Congress, through legislation, has explicitly recognized
this fact.63 The nation’s innovation base presents a target for modern
60

See G. John Ikenberry, Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World
Order in Transition, 5 INT’L RELS. OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 133, 133 (2005).
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Id.
62
Peter Harris, When Will the Unipolar World End?, NAT’L INTEREST (May
27, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/when-will-unipolar-world-end59202 [https://perma.cc/D9QB-E592].
63
50 U.S.C. §§ 1901(b)(c), 1902. Congress, in passing the David L. Boren
National Security Education Act of 1991, stated that “the security of the United
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adversaries to manipulate in order to erode the nation’s military or
economic power. Softness in innovation capabilities poses a potential
weakness that adversaries can exploit for their own geopolitical aims.
Unlike America’s past economic rivalry with Great Britain,64
adversaries’ goals and means of achieving them threaten American
culture, values, and national defense. The rise of foreign challengers
(specifically China), the associated national security consequences,
and the formulation of defensive counterstrategies form the
substance of this Article.
III. CHINESE ECONOMIC ASCENDENCY AND GEOPOLITICAL
GOALS
China’s growing economic influence, trade policies, and tactics
have significant implications for the U.S.65 The actual size of the
Chinese economy is the subject of debate amongst experts.66 While
Figure 3 shows that Chinese GDP, on a Purchasing Power Parity
(“PPP”) basis, exceeds American GDP, PPP measures overestimate
China’s economic power since prices for goods are significantly
lower there.67 Measured in U.S. dollars, China’s GDP in 2018 was
65.3% of United States’ GDP.68

exercise international leadership is, and will increasingly continue to be, based on
the political and economic strength of the United States, as well as on United
States military strength.” Id. §§ 1901(b)(1)–(2). The Act funded educational
initiatives to better position the United States for economic and strategic
competition in an increasingly global world. Id. §§ 1901(c)–1902.
64
ALLISON, supra note 1, at 197 (noting that Britain acquiesced in part due to
America’s economic and political rise and in part due to a shared system of values,
language, and political governance).
65
WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE:
HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1
(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RPC-VCR8].
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Id. at 9.
67
Id. (noting there is some debate as to whether a PPP basis or U.S. dollar basis
yields the truest picture of the size and purchasing power of the Chinese
economy).
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Prior to 1978, China practiced a Soviet-style communist
economic system.69 China launched a series of economic reforms
that encouraged the formation of new businesses and foreign
investments following the death of Chairman Mao.70 From 1979,
when reform began, until 2017, China’s real GDP grew at an
average annual rate of ten percent.71 This growth constituted the
fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.72 The
increased purchasing power of Chinese consumers, and the sheer
size of the Chinese market, led to an increase in bilateral commercial
ties with the U.S.73 China is currently America’s largest merchandise
trading partner, its largest source of imports, and its third-largest
export market.74
The emergence of China as an economic power concerns U.S.
policy and lawmakers, who believe China engages in unfair trade
practices.75 Many policymakers contend China engages in
mercantilist practices such as undervaluing its currency and
subsidizing domestic producers.76 China’s industrial policies also
face criticism for erecting barriers to the participation of foreign
firms and for undermining their competitiveness by failing to
enforce and protect intellectual property rights.77
Each of these behaviors might be seen as unwelcome, but not
uncommon, mercantilist activities. India, Brazil, Argentina,
Thailand, Vietnam, and Russia were all recently ranked
“Moderate-High” on a 2019 index of nations’ mercantilist practices.78
China, however, was noteworthy for being the only country ranked
69
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in the uppermost, “High” category.79 China handily outdistanced
other nations to unambiguously claim the title of the “world’s most
innovation-mercantilist nation.”80
The Chinese government views a growing economy as vital to
lifting its citizens out of poverty and maintaining social stability.81
One widely held view in trade policy circles is that China’s rapid
economic growth will integrate China into the world economy and
bring mostly positive ancillary benefits to developed economies,
such as the U.S.82 Any deleterious impacts from China’s economic
rise and mercantilist trade practices were thought to be a temporary
burden borne by a modest number of workers in limited market
segments.83
A recent survey of economic research reveals such beliefs
underestimated the job loss in developed economies.84 Chinese
mercantilist practices have caused harm that is more severe than
previously forecasted.85 Even more troubling, this recent research
documents numerous studies showing that China’s trade expansion
practices negatively impact innovation in most developed nations—
particularly in North America and Europe.86 In particular, one study
found that firms reduce R&D investment when they belong to
industries that are exposed to foreign export competition of the type
exhibited by China.87 Even advanced economies, such as that of the
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Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24543, 2018), https://www.nber.org/
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U.S., suffer from a reduction in aggregate innovation if enough of
these firms exist within their economies.88
Additional economic literature shows that restrictive trade
policies and protectionism ultimately suppress innovation and
adversely impact the long-term economic growth of the
implementing country.89 Restrictive trade policies increase the cost
of local production and require local firms to raise prices or reduce
investment in response.90 Protectionist barriers also foreclose the
import of potentially superior goods, thereby reducing the welfare
of the local population who must settle for the consumption of a
potentially inferior product.91 Furthermore, in nations affected by
these trade barriers, innovation-producing activities are retarded,
thereby reducing the number of new products and services available
both worldwide and in the barrier-erecting economy.92 For this
additional reason, one policy view is that countries, such as China,
will abandon or recede from their mercantilist practices as they are
ultimately self-defeating and harmful.93
Such beliefs make two potentially false assumptions. First,
China has not engineered mechanisms to mitigate the negative
consequences of their mercantilist practices. For example, why
suffer from the absence of imports of superior products if one can
simply abscond with the overseas technology and reproduce it at
home? Second, China’s behavior is ultimately that of a rational
economic actor on the world stage; the nation’s mercantilist
motivations and objectives lie purely in the realm of economic
policy divorced from other geopolitical objectives. The existence of
non-economic objectives, however, renders China less amenable to
altering its behavior in response to traditional free market forces, or
88
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succumbing to pressure from post-World War II liberal economic
institutions.
IV. INNOVATION WARFARE EXPLAINED
China’s innovation-mercantilist practices must be examined in
the broader context of China’s stated global political objectives.
Several authors suggest China’s long-term ambitions include
unseating the United States as the world’s political leader.94 Chinese
writings about the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and
redressing the “Century of Humiliation” are ambiguous enough in
meaning that they could be read to support such a premise.95 The
2017 National Security Strategy notes that both China and Russia
aim to challenge U.S. power and influence and to erode American
security and prosperity.96
China electing to pursue such aims via non-military means is
consistent with its own published national security treatises.97 One
widely read Chinese treatise laid out a framework for “unrestricted
warfare,” in which pursuit of national security will no longer depend
on military might, but will expand to all manner of non-violent
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See, e.g., WARD, supra note 1, at 19; SPALDING & KAUFMAN, supra note 1;
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See KAREN M. SUTTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10964, “MADE IN CHINA
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conflict having the same or similar destructive potential as war.98
The treatise states:
For a long time, both military people and politicians have become
accustomed to employing a certain mode of thinking, that is, the major
factor posing a threat to national security is the military power of an
enemy state or potential enemy state. However, the wars and major
incidents which have occurred during the last ten years of the 20th
century have provided to us in calm and composed fashion, proof that
the opposite is true: military threats are already often no longer the major
factors affecting national security. Even though they are the same ancient
territorial disputes, nationality conflicts, religious clashes, and the
delineation of spheres of power in human history, and are still the several
major agents of people waging war from opposite directions, these
traditional factors are increasingly becoming more intertwined with
grabbing resources, contending for markets, controlling capital, trade
sanctions, and other economic factors, to the extent that they are even
becoming secondary to these factors.99

These same authors go on to say the “use of national defense as
the main target of national security for a nation actually seems a bit
outmoded, and at the least is quite insufficient.”100 There is no need
to inflict upon the world the carnage of war if one’s geopolitical
aims can be achieved via other competitive means. “The Chinese
have figured out that if they just stay with ‘peaceful rise’ and just
contest for first position economically and technologically, they
cannot lose.”101
The theoretical concept of synchronizing and marshalling all
aspects of national power, short of conventional armed hostilities, is
not new. George Kennan, the principal architect of the U.S. strategy
in the Cold War, christened such practices as “political warfare.”102
These competitive grand strategies manifest as a gray zone of
conflict, blurring conventional black and white definitions of war
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and peace.103 They nonetheless represent chronic and potentially
dangerous tensions with significant stakes. The United States now
recognizes that it exists in a great power competition with China.104
China is challenging the liberal world order led by the United States,
and also challenging, if not outright rejecting, the values of human
dignity and freedom enshrined in this world order.105
The Chinese government’s grand political warfare strategy is an
economic one.106 China is a recognized master at using economic
instruments to achieve geopolitical goals.107 According to the
Congressional Research Service, China uses its wealth to advance
its security interests in the Pacific, formalize integration with the
economies of other nations, and exert increasing influence on
international institutions such as the United Nations, International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.108 China’s official government
development plan for the years 2020 to 2049 aims to transform
China into the world leader in innovation.109 Building and enlarging
its economy through innovation continues to be at the heart of the
Chinese strategy, since technology and innovation are drivers of
both economic growth and national security.110
Within China’s grand political economic strategy is evidence of
not only mercantilist trade protection practices, but also of a
sophisticated sub-strategy specifically targeting American
technology and innovation. The Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental (“DIUX”) and the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission each conducted a review of Chinese
technology transfer activities aimed at acquiring American
103
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expertise.111 The White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing
Policy published an additional report on the topic in 2018.112 All
three reports had similar findings.113 As the DIUX team noted, the
emerging composite picture “illustrates the intent, design, and
dedication of a regime focused on technology transfer at a massive
scale.”114
Technology acquisition efforts occur with equal vigor at home
and abroad. American firms doing business with a Chinese firm do
not engage in free market activities with a commercial counterpart.
The Chinese economy is state-led.115 The Communist Party retains
control over most Chinese industries and companies, including
those at the top of the Fortune Global 500.116 Leaders of Chinese
firms must be members of the Communist Party.117 The industrial
espionage and technology transfer activities waged by China and
Chinese corporations effectively conscript American business into
service as the research and development arm of the Chinese state.118
Figure 6 diagrams the vehicles for Chinese technology transfer
from the United States as originally identified by the three reports.
The figure contains some modifications from an original figure
drawn in the DIUX report. The changes reflect additional,
subsequently identified, vectors for transfer as further described
below. While the DIUX report identified a highly aggressive and
illegal cyber espionage campaign disproportionately larger than that
of other countries, many of the technology transfer activities
111
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leverage mechanisms not barred by law.119 Principle among these are
foreign direct investment, venture capital investment, talent
acquisition, licensing (coerced and voluntary), and open-source data
mining.120

Figure 6. Chinese tactics for appropriating U.S. technology and
intellectual property121

The Authors’ research identified additional vectors utilized by
the Chinese to transfer technology from the United States to China.
These additional vectors are drawn as ovals in Figure 6. Because
these new observations are not previously discussed elsewhere, the
observations are described in greater detail below.
Chief among these newly emerging vectors of technology
acquisition is an increasing lack of data security for American firms
119
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doing business in China.122 A recent report on U.S. Department of
Defense supply chain security tallied seven Chinese laws that
compel disclosure of firms’ technical information to the Chinese
government or corporate partners.123 An additional Chinese
regulation in late 2019 forbade the use of secure internet networks,
or virtual private networks (“VPNs”), commonly used by U.S. firms
working in China to maintain the privacy and security of their
information.124 Not only are such networks banned, but the Chinese
government concurrently announced that all internet traffic within
the country would be monitored and mined using big data
analytics.125 A newly created national official shall oversee the data
harvesting and analytics operation.126 Whether the recent Phase I
trade agreement has any impact on these practices and on the new
regulation is unclear.
The Chinese also actively participate in U.S. consensus
standards setting activities.127 These mostly western-based
organizations establish common technical interfaces between
devices and common operating architectures.128 Without such
standards, computers would not be able to physically connect to
122
See TARA BEENY ET AL., SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES FROM CHINA IN
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123
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monitors or logically transfer information to them for display.
Consensus standards involve the participation of interested
technology companies who share some details about their systems
in hopes of influencing the resulting standards definition. Firms
lucky enough to get their technology adopted as a standard might
dominate the technological evolution of that interface and the
resulting profits for years to come. The Chinese firm Huawei has the
largest 5G patent portfolio, with the Chinese firm ZTE ranking fifth
according to one recent report.129 The top-ranked U.S. firm,
Qualcomm, ranked seventh.130
In addition, China has promoted copying of American
innovations by systemically devaluing the intellectual property
rights of western entities. China recently bid to lead the World
Intellectual Property Organization, a move widely regarded as
placing the breadth and scope of the world’s intellectual property
portfolios at risk.131 The country’s penchant for filing immense
numbers of patent applications may serve primarily as a basis to
invalidate others’ rights rather than a sincere desire to acquire such
rights for themselves.132 China has also devalued western intellectual
129
IPLYTICS, supra note 127. Note that these statistics are based on selfdeclarations, not confirmed standard essential patents.
130
Id. (reporting that U.S. participation in 5G standard setting bodies is lower
than that of competing firms with Qualcomm’s level of attendance ranking fourth
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meetings. Id. These numbers demonstrate that Chinese firms grasp the strategic
importance of standard setting activities and also recognize that participation in
those forums provides the legal means to both access and influence developing
technologies. Id. Note that 5G standard essential patents (“SEP”) declarations are
self-reported, so actual SEP portfolios could differ greatly.
131
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132
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property rights through restrictive laws on licensing. In particular,
China limits the time a foreign rights holder has exclusive control
over patented technology in domestic license agreements.133 After
expiration of the license, domestic firms are entitled to use licensed
technology regardless of any residual intellectual property rights
held by the licensor.134 These activities do not constitute a direct
technology transfer, but they do promote copying of American
technology by neutering the legal protections surrounding it.
The White House labels the collection of China’s technology
transfer activities as “aggression.”135 Specifically, the White House
notes that much of China’s economic growth has been achieved
through “aggressive” acts, policies, and practices that fall outside of
global norms and rules (collectively, “economic aggression”).136
These technology transfer behaviors can be seen as a competitive
strategy supporting China’s grand political strategy, and not merely
a form of market competition.
The sum of the aforementioned activities constitutes a particular
form of competitive strategy targeting America’s innovation
ecosystem. This newly articulated doctrine, “Innovation Warfare,”
is defined as follows.
An executable competitive strategy:
a) Reflecting an innovation, intellectual property, and
technology strategy articulated and executed by the state
(e.g. China);
b) Using illegal means, political means, and legal economic
activities—of the type previously residing solely in the
province of commercial enterprise, to achieve the state’s
objectives;

perma.cc/K4WM-K85P]; 4 Reasons Why Defensively Publishing Your Technical
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c) Employing these economic and innovation activities to
achieve both economic geopolitical power and to enhance
military capabilities; and
d) Functioning as a military, national security, and defense
doctrine not solely a reflection of the state’s economic policy
goals nor commercial competition in the ordinary course.
Innovation Warfare does not only threaten American jobs and
economic prosperity. By simultaneously co-opting and weakening
the innovation capabilities of the United States, China seeks to
advance its rise to world power.137 Over the course of history, there
have been sixteen such times when one rising power sought to
overtake an existing world power.138 All but four of those historical
events provoked armed conflict.139 China’s Innovation Warfare
activities risk the type of economic and geopolitical aggression that
were a root cause of two World Wars.140
China challenges and outright rejects the rules-based
international economic order designed to keep the peace.141 China’s
leadership sees these rules as “American” and made when the
Chinese were not present at the table. China now seeks to rewrite
these rules according to its desires.142 China’s rejection of rulesbased economic principles, as embodied in the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), intellectual property treaties, and other
agreements, is destabilizing.
China’s prosecution of Innovation Warfare and its rejection of a
rules-based order also poses an existential threat. A world where
China dominates the technology landscape is not just about who
earns the profits or prevails in an abstract geopolitical fight. China
pursues a world in which economies are less free, less fair, and less
likely to respect human dignity and freedoms, according to the
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National Security Strategy.143 Chinese culture differs from American
culture in profound ways.144 Chinese internet and data mining
products are not likely to embody American values of privacy and
freedom of expression.145 China already uses facial recognition
technology, data mining, and other twenty-first century innovations
to track and score its citizens’ behaviors.146 The Chinese government
uses these measures to conform citizens’ behaviors to a
government-determined standard and to deny citizens who fail to
conform freedoms and benefits.147 Chinese companies were recently
accused of inappropriately using backdoors built into
telecommunications equipment to monitor the lives of people,
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See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 8.
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 25, 223–25 (2003).
145
Shaun Waterman, Gary Shapiro Calls 5G ‘Battleground’ Between US and
China, VIA SATELLITE (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.satellitetoday.com/
innovation/2019/11/05/gary-shapiro-calls-5g-battleground-between-us-andchina/undefined [https://perma.cc/J6EA-MCRE]; SPALDING & KAUFMAN, supra
note 1, at xii-xiv.
146
Charlie Campbell, How China Is Using “Social Credit Scores” to Reward and
Punish Its Citizens, TIME (2019), https://time.com/collection/davos-2019/5502592/
china-social-credit-score/ [https://perma.cc/5Y5G-VF3N] (documenting a variety of
tracking technologies, including facial recognition, and systems designed to create
a complex reward and punishment system for Chinese citizens). While these
efforts can be seen as a reflection of a culture wishing to stamp out disorder and
fraud, as Campbell observes “they are undeniably intrusive.” Id.
147
See Louise Matsakis, How the West Got China’s Social Credit System
Wrong, WIRED (July 29, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/chinasocial-credit-score-system/ [https://perma.cc/X7LU-GT5X] (arguing that initial
reporting about the system was based on secondhand information and was
intended “as a cautionary tale for” western uses of similar technologies). This
updated reporting based on original language and better source reporting does,
however, document a complicated interwoven system that can deny travel and
other benefits. Id. As many as 13 million people are on the Supreme People’s
Court blacklist. Id. For a view of how Chinese citizens view the social credit
system in the context of Chinese culture, see Xinyuan Wang, Hundreds of Chinese
Citizens Told Me What They Thought About the Controversial Social Credit
System,
CONVERSATION
(Dec.
17,
2019,
5:41
AM),
http://theconversation.com/hundreds-of-chinese-citizens-told-me-what-they-thoughtabout-the-controversial-social-credit-system-127467 [https://perma.cc/DR8B-J65Z].
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regardless of citizenship or location.148 As the President and CEO of
the Consumer Technology Association said in relation to the battle
over telecommunications technology, “[o]ur children’s standard of
living, their way of life, will depend on how well we do . . . . [I]f we
lose, we lose potentially, those other battles about who we are as a
nation and our focus on individual liberty.”149 For at least each of
these reasons, Innovation Warfare presents America with a threat
against which it must defend itself.
V. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. INNOVATION
WARFARE COUNTERSTRATEGY
In recognition of the Innovation Warfare threat, defending the
nation’s innovation base against competitors became an element of
the country’s National Security Strategy in 2017.150 A number of
contemporary whitepapers and reports subsequently laid out
thoughtful recommendations on how best to proceed.151 Each of
these reports, summarized below, concludes that the United States
lacks a comprehensive counter-competitive strategy.152 However,

148
See Bojan Pancevski, U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom
Networks, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2020, 8:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-sofficials-say-huawei-can-covertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256
[https://perma.cc/7D2H-H273] (describing Huawei’s use of telecommunications
backdoors to illicitly access private telecommunications traffic). The backdoors
were put in place post-9/11 for use by law enforcement to conduct surveillance
under warrant. Huawei denies the allegations. The U.S. claims to have proof. Id.
149
Waterman, supra note 145 (speaking on the importance of 5G cellular
technologies at DC5G).
150
See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 8, at 21.
151
See WARD, supra note 1, at 95.
152
See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2, at 4 (“The U.S. government does not
have a holistic view of how fast this technology transfer is occurring, the level of
Chinese investment in U.S. technology, or what technologies we should be
protecting.”); see also WARD, supra note 1, at xii (citing Admiral Scott Swift,
U.S. Navy (Retired), on “the necessity of the United States to develop a grand
strategy of its own”); JAMES MANYIK ET AL., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 77, INNOVATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY: KEEPING OUR EDGE 3 (2019), https://www.cfr.org/report/keeping-ouredge/pdf/TFR_Innovation_Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X4G-YXSW] (noting that
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the aggregation of the many meritorious suggestions contained
within these reports still does not yield a coherent grand
counterstrategy.
Bradford Lee documented four distinct, but not mutually
exclusive, categories of competitive strategies or counterstrategies,
useful here for organizing and assessing the myriad of existing
proposals for an Innovation Warfare response.153 The categories
have been rephrased slightly and adapted here for the Authors’
purposes. The four counter-competitive strategies, as identified by
Lee, are summarized as follows:
1) Denial: These strategies neutralize the impact of the
competitor’s strategy. Thus, even if the competitor executes
the elements of their strategy successfully, their desired
objective will not be achieved. In the context of Innovation
Warfare, strategies that enhance America’s innovation
capabilities are an example of a denial strategy. Even if
China’s Innovation Warfare strategy executes as planned,
America will simply outrun and outperform it in the
innovation race. Other denial strategies thwart execution of
the competitor’s strategy. Review and approval of foreign
investment by the Department of Treasury to prevent foreign
ownership of critical American technologies is one example.
To distinguish these two different forms of Innovation
Warfare denial strategies, they have been renamed as:
“Outperform” and “Thwart.”
2) Cost Imposition: These strategies seek to impose
consequences or ratchet up the costs for pursuing the
competitive strategy such that the costs for pursuing the
strategy negate the benefits. Trade wars and economic
sanctions are the most common forms of cost imposition. In

“the government and the private sector must undertake a comprehensive and
urgent response”).
153
See TAI MING CHEUNG & THOMAS MAHNKEN, THE GATHERING PACIFIC STORM:
EMERGING US-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 20–23 (2018).
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the context of Innovation Warfare, cost imposition strategies
can include enforcement of intellectual property rights.
3) Co-opting the Competitor’s Strategy: These strategies either
leverage elements of the adversary’s own strategy against
them or induce the adversary to take actions that reduce the
effectiveness of their strategy. For example, in the context of
Innovation Warfare, the Chinese penchant for devaluing
western intellectual property rights by publishing an
extensive quantity of prior art documents also serves as a
source of competitive intelligence about Chinese research
activities.
4) Political Leverage: These strategies exploit or influence
factors within an adversary’s political system. Persuading
the Chinese populace against intellectual property theft may
prove difficult. In the context of Innovation Warfare,
however, the political ecosystem is much broader and
includes other nation states, trading partners, and
international institutions.154
Table 1155 summarizes the defensive countermeasures
recommended by existing studies and whitepapers, organized by the
type of counterstrategy employed

154

Id.
MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 152; BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2; ATKINSON &
EZELL, supra note 16; BRAD SMITH & CAROL ANN BROWNE, TOOLS AND WEAPONS:
THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF THE DIGITAL AGE (2019); Letter from Kelvin K.
Droegemeier, Dir., White House Off. of Sci. and Tech. Pol’y, to the U.S. Rsch. Cmty.
(Sept. 16, 2019); IP Attache Services, USPTO https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/ipattache-program/ip-attache-services [https://perma.cc/G55H-SYYX]; BEENY,
supra note 122; see also DEP’T OF DEF., INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY REPORT:
PREPAREDNESS, PARTNERSHIP, AND PROMOTING A NETWORKED REGION (2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENTOF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF
[https://perma.cc/46ZX-M79F] (incorporating the National Defense Strategy and
recommending the strengthening of economic partnerships in the region to counter
Chinese influence); WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CRITICAL AND
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL
STRATEGY], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/10/NationalStrategy-for-CET.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HU5-7RG6].
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The vast majority of recommended actions documented in Table
1 seek to outperform Chinese innovation accretion by improving the
United States’ own domestic innovation infrastructure and
capabilities. Official White House documents on the topic include A
Strategy for American Innovation, which has not been itemized in
Table 1, but falls squarely in this camp and mirrors many of the
recommendations of Table 1.156 The most recent White House
document, National Strategy for Critical and Emerging
Technologies, articulates the goal of maintaining U.S. world
leadership in critical and emerging technologies.157 Attainment of
this goal rests on two major pillars, the first of which clearly seeks
to bolster the U.S. innovation ecosystem to outperform the Chinese
ecosystem.158 Data in Table 1 reflects key measures called for in the
National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies. Other than
the Success Act, which aims to diversify the nation’s pool of
inventors, specific executable steps with measurable outcomes for
pursuit initiatives in this category could not be identified.159
Some of the other categories of recommendations given in Table
1 have been implemented with varying degrees of success. The
government appears to be proactively pursuing measures designed
to directly thwart China’s technology appropriation tactics. Treasury
Department guidelines for review of foreign investments under the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”)

156
See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, A STRATEGY FOR
AMERICAN INNOVATION (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/strategy_for_american_innovation_october_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVU8WPKP].
157
See generally WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155.
158
Id. at 2, 7.
159
See Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing Engineering and Science
Success Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-273, 132 Stat. 4158 (recognizing that
“patents and intellectual property are important engines of innovation, invention,
and economic growth,” and that “there is a significant gap in the number of patents
applied for and obtained by women and minorities.”). The Act also directed the
United States Patent Office and others to work to close this gap.
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regulations were tightened in 2018.160 These revised guidelines
brought increased scrutiny of Chinese investments in critical and
emerging technologies.161 As a result, Chinese investment in U.S.
firms fell eighty-three percent in 2018, from $29 billion to $5 billion
in 2017, and from a previous high of $46 billion in 2016.162
The White House issued an open letter to the nation’s research
institutions in 2019.163 This letter began a dialogue regarding
Chinese efforts to acquire U.S. taxpayer-funded research via a
variety of mechanisms, including direct sponsorship of U.S. faculty,
placement of Chinese nationals at U.S. research institutions, student
exchanges, and outright theft of research.164 While the letter
contained no specific directives, this initial dialogue undoubtedly
raised institutional awareness of the matter. Subsequent to issuance
of the letter, several institutions took action against researchers who
failed to disclose their relationships with Chinese institutions.165 The
160

See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, §§ 1701–28, 132 Stat. 2174, 540 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4656)
(adding four new categories of review to the previous regulations: (i) purchase or
lease of land proximate government facilities; (ii) investments that may provide
access to certain nonpublic technical information of U.S. businesses; (iii) changes
in foreign investor’s rights resulting in control of a U.S. business; and (iv) any
other transaction designed to circumvent CFIUS jurisdiction).
161
See id.
162
Paul Wisman, China’s Investment in US Drops 83% Amid Growing
Mistrust, ASSOCIATED P RESS (May 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/
d3009cef73e24479ac53e8ad968effcd [https://perma.cc/DB5W-ECRY].
163
See Droegemeier, supra note 155.
164
Id.
165
See, e.g., Tara Law, Emory University Fires 2 Neuroscientists Accused of
Hiding Chinese Ties, TIME (May 25, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://time.com/5596066/
emory-fires-chinese-researchers/ [https://perma.cc/69UQ-3SXR]; Mike Zaveri,
Wary of Chinese Espionage, Houston Cancers Center Chose to Fire 3 Scientists,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/health/mdanderson-chinese-scientists.html
[https://perma.cc/2A4X-LQXV];
Jeffrey
Mervis, NIH probe of foreign ties has led to undisclosed firings – and refunds
from institutions, SCI. (June 26, 2019, 5:10 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2019/06/nih-probe-foreign-ties-has-led-undisclosed-firings-and-refundsinstitutions [https://perma.cc/3KE6-A6EL]; Press Release, Dep’t. of Just.,
Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three
Separate China Related Cases (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 also
included several provisions designed to protect U.S. researchers
from foreign influence and directed the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy to establish an interagency working
group to further protect federally funded research from foreign
interference.166
Of the remaining recommendations documented in Table 1, on
which significant actions have been taken, the most notable is the
current “trade war” resulting from the President’s imposition of
tariffs for national security reasons under Sections 232 and 301 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.167 These tariffs were met with the
imposition by China of tariffs on U.S. imports.168 As of this writing,
the U.S. Trade Representative has concluded “Phase I” of
negotiations with China to cease the exchange of punitive tariffs.169
harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separatechina-related [https://perma.cc/N8EF-7X3X].
166
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L No. 11692 §§ 228, 1746, 116 Stat. 1790-646 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/
bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WKW-SMXQ] (directing the
Secretary of Defense in Section 228 to carry out research on foreign malign influence
operations in university research programs). Section 1746 of the Act states:
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, acting
through the National Science and Technology Council, in consultation
with the National Security Advisor, shall establish or designate an
interagency working group to coordinate activities to protect federally
funded research and development from foreign interference, cyberattacks, theft, or espionage and to develop common definitions and best
practices for Federal science agencies and grantees, while accounting for
the importance of the open exchange of ideas and international talent
required for scientific progress and American leadership in science and
technology.
Id. § 1746.
167
WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE
ISSUES, 51–52 (July 30, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SFC4-RBH9]
168
Id.
169
See What’s in the U.S.-China ‘phase one’ Trade Deal, REUTERS (Dec. 13,
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-details-factbox/whatsin-the-u-s-china-phase-one-trade-deal-idUSKBN1YH2IL [https://perma.cc/TP4369XP].
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These negotiations struck an accord on agricultural trade and certain
intellectual property matters, but left unresolved many of the
necessary negotiations on key intellectual property and innovation
issues at the root of China’s Innovation Warfare strategy until
“Phase II.”170 Specifically, the agreement does not appear to address
the theft of intellectual property by Chinese companies.171
The National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies
also contains a smattering of additional political strategy
measures.172 Specifically, the document calls for increased
communication with the private sector to raise public awareness and
to enlist the cooperation and assistance of industry in guarding
against innovation ecosystem vulnerabilities.173 The document
additionally lists initiatives that foster the incorporation of
democratic norms and ideals into the innovation process via private
sector and international alliances.174 While a limited subset of the
enumerated initiatives is described with specificity, most are simply
aspirational.175
Not listed in Table 1 are the myriad of legislative initiatives,
currently pending in Congress, intended to repulse the Innovation
Warfare threat posed by China. The Authors’ research reveals at
least twenty such bills introduced by members of both parties, but
as of yet, none have been taken up for vote or transmitted to the other
chamber.176 The majority of this pending legislation concerns the
imposition of sanctions or penalties for intellectual property theft, or
otherwise proposes restrictions on trade with certain entities.177
170

Rachel Layne, Here’s What’s in the U.S.-China “Phase One” Trade Deal,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-china-trade-dealheres-whats-in-the-us-china-phase-one-trade-deal/ [https://perma.cc/9K5F-9JR7].
171
Id. (citing U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer).
172
See WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155.
173
Id. at 10.
174
Id. at 7.
175
See id.
176
This research included a search of www.congress.gov for pending
legislation and its status as of January 2020.
177
See, e.g., Preventing SBA Assistance from Going to China Act of 2019,
S.75, 116th Cong. (2019); Telecommunications Denial Order Enforcement Act,
S. 152, 116th Cong. (2019); Sanction Entities in China for Undermining Rules,
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Congress recently heard testimony from the Department of Defense
on its efforts to combat the threat from China, but, as of yet, no clear
mandates for executable actions have emerged.178
Despite an attempt to organize existing recommendations and
initiatives using the format suggested by Lee, current
recommendations and pending legislative actions consist mostly of
a list of meritorious, but loosely related tactics when viewed in
totality. Prior white papers and reports nonetheless contain many
constructive and worthwhile ideas that should be implemented. The
National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies is
commendable for recognizing the need for a unified government
approach.179 This official policy document also does much to
advance the formulation of a national Innovation Warfare
counterstrategy by defining those critical technologies in which it is
necessary to lead and those for which risks must simply be
mitigated.180 Yet, a significant number of the actions called for in
support of those objectives lack particulars and remain ambiguous
in scope and execution.181 The viability of this strategy document
past the current national election cycle is also uncertain. Thus,
existing recommendations and initiatives, even when taken together,
fail to define a comprehensive counterstrategy for three principal
reasons:
1) Existing recommendations focus largely on boosting the
nation’s innovation capacity but infrequently establish
broader objectives, measurable outcomes, or endpoints. This
omission makes assessing strategic effectiveness difficult
both because the desired end state is uncertain as well as
because there are no feedback loops to assess progress
against goals and make mid-course corrections.
Exploiting Intellectual Property Act of 2019, S.1092, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero
Tolerance for Electronics Theft Act, H.R. 2841, 116th Cong. (2019).
178
See generally DOD’s Role in Competing with China, Hearing before the Armed
Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://armedservices.house.gov/2020/1/
full-committee-hearing [https://perma.cc/L7T8-DCMD] (noting the Committee took
testimony from three witnesses each of whom identified possible DoD roles).
179
See WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155, at 1–2.
180
Id. at 3–4.
181
See id.
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2) Existing reports and recommendations rest principally on
refortifying the strength of the American innovation
ecosystem and fail to recognize the value of choke points or
control positions in securing needed innovation resources
and in making progress along future innovation roadmaps.
In particular, existing efforts underappreciate intellectual
property as one form of control position, and underutilize
intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation
Warfare battlespace.
3) No allocation of roles and responsibilities exists. While
some authors and official documents have called for a
“whole of government approach,” there is no discernable
lead to coordinate the effort, no visible assignment of
tasking, no sharing of information and resources, and no
specified organizational design for executing upon the
strategy.182
VI. CRAFTING AN INNOVATION WARFARE COUNTERSTRATEGY
The United States must urgently articulate and execute a
defensive Innovation Warfare counterstrategy in view of the above
findings. While the United States cannot be sure of the metes and
bounds of the Chinese Innovation Warfare efforts, construction of
the U.S. counterstrategy should be guided by certain core principles.
First, the United States acts as a nation that respects personal
liberties and the rights of its people. Formulation and execution of
an Innovation Warfare defense strategy do not equate to nationalism
or xenophobic behaviors. Assessing the risk presented by individual
foreign nationals is a totality of the circumstances evaluation that
balances a free and open society against potential harms. In twentyfirst century world where big data and analytics provide intelligence
and competitive advantages to those in possession of it, the United
States must establish and adhere to norms on its use while respecting
individual freedoms and rights to privacy.

182

See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2, at 3, 25; see also WARD, supra note 1,
at xiv.
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Second, the post-World War II economic order led to an
international rules-based system of laws that are invaluable for
avoiding armed conflict. Some may fairly criticize this liberal
economic order as imperfect. However, an international system of
rules-based trade is a means of peace. The Innovation Warfare
competitive strategies run by China seek to undermine confidence
in and alter the rules-based systems surrounding trade, innovation,
and intellectual property.
These Innovation Warfare strategies are destabilizing. Although
Innovation Warfare competitive strategies run by adversaries may
have consequences as drastic as war, successful counterstrategies
must both remain within the rules paradigm and avoid escalation
ladders to armed conflict.
Third, Innovation Warfare counterstrategies should remain
consistent with and support the National Security Strategy and the
National Defense Strategy of the United States.
Fundamentally, at its core, Innovation Warfare is about seizing
control of the technological future(s), thereby securing a dominant
economic and security position from which to accomplish other
geopolitical aims. In view of that central observation, the necessity
for a coherent strategic response, and the principles articulated
above, a four-step approach to crafting and executing the needed
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy is proposed:
1) Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Develop machine
learning tools to identify the possible technological futures
and drive towards the preferred future(s);
2) Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and scope
federal R&D spending to seed the innovations necessary to
attain the preferred future(s);
3) Secure Technology Control Positions – Identify and secure
control positions along the preferred future technology
implementation path, including deploying and protecting
intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation
Warfare battlespace; and
4) Organize to Win – Develop cross-functional capabilities and
inter-organizational coordination both within the government
and across the public-private interface.
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VII. THE ELEMENTS OF AN INNOVATION WARFARE
COUNTERSTRATEGY
Seizing control of the technological future presupposes the
satisfaction of several preconditions. First, one can identify the set
of multiple possible future(s) that could possibly arise from the
present state. Second, there exists some framework for assessing
which of these alternative future(s) would be preferable over the
others. Third, one possesses both the mechanisms and the means to
drive towards and achieve the preferred future state(s). Fourth, one
can organize to manage the attainment of each of these
preconditions.
A. Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Identify Possible
Technological Future(s) and Drive Towards the Preferred
Technological Future(s)
One cannot seize control of the technological future(s) if one
cannot see the evolution of potential future(s). Although the
National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies itemizes
critical technologies in which the United States must lead, such lists
are merely a grainy, low-resolution snapshot of current times.183 The
entity with the best and earliest intelligence about emerging
technological trends and evolutions can most effectively optimize
their innovation investments and gain an early lead in critical
technology areas. The nation state with the most advanced and
robust forecasting tool is the one likely to prevail in the Innovation
Warfare competition.
Fortunately, this first precondition is no longer the stuff of fairy
dust or expert opinions. Prior to 2005, little scholarship or
development of analytic capabilities for technology prediction
existed.184 Companies wishing to lay out future strategic direction
183

See WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155, Annex (identifying a
list of twenty technology areas); see also Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Dir.,
Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, to The Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 1
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/M-2029.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WE3-EPKR] (identifying five R&D budgetary positions).
184
Katarzyna Halicka, Main Concepts of Technology Analysis in the Light of
the Literature on the Subject, 182 PROCEDIA ENG’G 291, 292 (2017).
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and technology roadmaps were the initial developers of, and still
rely heavily on, these first-generation predictive techniques as a
source of competitive intelligence.185 These first-generation
techniques depend almost exclusively on the analysis of patent and
patent application databases. Two such tools employed during this
early time period were backward/forward patent citation analysis
and patent landscape, or contour mapping.186
Both of these early technology analysis methods remain widely
used today.187 These early methods, however, really only provide
snapshots of the status quo from which a patenting entity’s areas of
technology investment and patenting strength relative to others can
be inferred. These earlier methods are raised and explained here
only to distinguish them from the advanced big data analytic
185
See Brian de Haaff, 8 Key Components of Technology Roadmaps, HUFF
POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/8-key-components- oftechn_b_9413856 [https://perma.cc/7DYP-F7LF]; see also Eric P. Raciti, IP
Landscaping – Creating a Conceptual Fabric of Information, FINNEGAN (June
2014), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/ip-landscaping-creating-aconceptual-fabric-of-information.html [https://perma.cc/GS5Z-QQEB] (advising
clients on the strategic advantages of landscaping tools).
186
Backward patent citation analysis examines the list of previously issued
patents referred to by a patent examiner when evaluating whether an invention is
patentable. Analysis of backward citations reveals concentrations of other
inventors or companies working in similar technology areas. Forward patent
citation analysis evaluates the number of times any given patent is cited elsewhere
by others. An earlier patent cited by many later patents likely documents an
important invention that served as the foundation for subsequent innovation. See,
e.g., M.M.S. Karki & Dr. K.S. Krishnan Road, Patent Citation Analysis: A Policy
Analysis Tool, 19 WORLD PAT. INFO. 269, 271 (1997). Patent landscape analysis,
provides a visual representation of clusters of patents organized by a common
theme, such as assignee or subject matter. In the map, the higher the “terrain,” the
greater the concentration of patenting activity within that technology, the more
similar the technology to others, the closer together their contours are horizontally
spaced. See, e.g., WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING PATENT
LANDSCAPE REPORTS 37–40 (2015), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/
wipo_pub_946.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZSW -AF53].
187
Jeffrey Kuhn, Kenneth Young & Alan Marco, Patent Citations Reexamined,
51 RAND J. OF ECON. 109, 109–111 (2020) (noting that although just a few patents
generate the majority of subsequent citations, thereby possibly distorting analysis
and limiting the usefulness of the tool, the tool remains viable); see also Raciti,
supra note 185.
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techniques currently under development, which form the focus of
this discussion.
Advanced technology forecasting tools belong to a class of
analytics known as Future-Oriented Technology Analysis
(“FTA”).188 FTA is an umbrella concept spanning a range of tools
used to analyze technology future(s) and their impacts.189 FTA
studies may be normative or exploratory.190 Normative FTA starts
from a preferred future and attempts to discern which actions would
result in that future.191 Explorative FTA focuses on forecasting
several possible future(s) and then conducting additional analyses to
assess the most probable or preferred future(s).192 FTA concepts by
themselves are not new, and the military and government have used
scenario planning, SWOT analysis, the Delphi technique, and other
first-generation FTA tools for more than fifty years in various
fashions.193
What is new is the explosion in quantitative methods for FTA
analysis enabled by big data and machine learning that make
existing technology forecasting tools far more robust than the
citation analysis, patent contour maps, and opinion-based methods
of the past.194 Recent techniques also differ from contemporary big

188

TUGRUL DAIM ET AL., ANTICIPATING FUTURE PATHWAYS THROUGH LARGE
DATA ANALYSIS x–xi (2016).
189
Helvio Jeronimo Junior et al., Approaching Future-Oriented Technology
Analysis Strategies in Knowledge Management Processes, INT’L CONF. ON
COMPUT. SUPPORTED COOP. WORK IN DESIGN (May 2019).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Daiane Ferrira, Carlos Eduardo Barbosa, Jonice Oliveira & Jano Moreira De
Souza, Analyzing the Collaborative Aspects of Future-Oriented Technology
Analysis, INT’L CONF. ON COMPUT. SUPPORTED COOP. WORK IN DESIGN (May
2016); see Delphi Method, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/topics/delphimethod.html [https://perma.cc/JKW6-GBBZ] (explaining the Delphi method,
developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s was originally used to forecast
the impact of technology on warfare using informed intuitive judgment).
194
DAIM ET AL., supra note 188, at ix (noting the advancements in
computational tools and the expansion of date sources beyond just patents and
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data tools in their ability to extend the forecast interval for
technology prediction.195 State of the art FTA can theoretically
analyze the current and immediate next stage of technology
evolution while providing insights on successive generations.196
Whereas earlier generation techniques might reveal one generation
ahead, machine learning FTA tools can anticipate next generation
“+n” evolutions in technology, wherein “n” represents the number
of successive generations.197
Modern FTA toolsets encompass a variety of different
methodologies, including technology data mining, technology
roadmapping, competitive technical intelligence (“CTI”) analysis,
bibliographic analysis, and webographic analysis that process not
only patent data, but also scientometric indicators, blogs,
trademarks, corporate security filings, speeches, and other relevant
databases.198 Korean authors Changyong Lee et al. describe one
example of such methods.199 The method employed by Lee et al.
analyzes patent application filings and uses neural networks to

acknowledging the growing acceptance of these tools for use in future oriented
analysis).
195
Earlier generation patent contour mapping, for example, simply provides a
current pictorial view of the existing patent landscape as it exists at a single
moment in the present. See YI ZHANG ET AL., GENERATING COMPETITIVE TECHNICAL
INTELLIGENCE USING TOPICAL ANALYSIS, PATENT CITATION ANALYSIS AND TERM
CLUMPING ANALYSIS, ANTICIPATING FUTURE INNOVATION PATHWAYS THROUGH
LARGE DATA ANALYSIS 156 (“Citation-based analysis has a fundamental limitation
in that it underestimates the importance of contemporary patents and may not
work in rapidly evolving industries where technology life cycles (“TFC”) are
increasingly short and too many new inventions are being patented throughout the
world.”); FTA by definition is “future oriented” and provides a variety of tools
useful for identifying multiple possible technology futures. Id. at xi–xvi.
196
ZHANG ET. AL., supra note 195, at 164–165 (identifying technology
trajectories for technology and sub-technology over a generational time horizon
spanning the years 1991 to 2014).
197
The Authors each have knowledge of proprietary techniques on which this
conclusion is based.
198
See DAIM ET AL., supra note 188, at ix–xvi.
199
See Changyong Lee et al., Early Identification of Emerging Technologies:
A Machine Learning Approach Using Multiple Patent Indicators, 127 TECH.
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 291, 291–92 (2018).
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identify emerging technologies at a very early stage.200 Their method
can additionally predict which of these emerging technologies is
more likely than other similar emerging technologies to materialize
as dominant over time.201 In additional examples, Park et al. describe
network analysis and time series models for predicting emerging
technology.202
Numerous other quantitative methodologies exist.203 Figure 7
diagrams one example of an FTA technique based on graphical
network analysis. Figure 7, while heavily simplified, provides a
basic explanation of how this method of explorative FTA works. In
actual practice, the analysis can employ a wide array of databases
beyond the patent databases shown in Figure 7. Extensive training
and validation of the machine learning algorithms are necessary to
produce valid results.

200

Id. at 292.
Id.
202
See Sang-Sung Park, Seung-Joo Lee, & Sunghae Jun, A Network Analysis
Model for Selecting Sustainable Technology, 7 SUSTAINABILITY 13126, 13126
(2015) (describing a network analysis model useful for planning R&D and picking
sustainable long-term technologies as a focus, with an analysis of Ford Motor
Co.); Jong-Chan Kim, Joon-Hyuck Lee, Gab- Jo Kim, Sang-Sung Park, & DongSick Jang, Time Series Analysis of Patent Keywords for Forecasting Emerging
Technology, 3 KIPS TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE & DATA ENG’G 355 (2014),
https://doi.org/10.3745/KTSDE.2014.3.9.355
[https://perma.cc/9BKS-79YC]
(describing the use of auto-regressive integrated moving averages (“ARIMA”),
which is a statistical analysis technique that uses time series data to predict future
trends and to forecast technology) (S. Kor.).
203
For a relatively recent summary of advanced patent analytic methods, see
Leonidas Aristodemou & Frank Tietze, The State-of-the-Art on Intellectual
Property Analytics (IPA): A Literature Review of Artificial Intelligence, Machine
Learning and Deep Learning Methods for Analysing Intellectual Property (IP),
55 WORLD PAT. INFO. 37, 41 (2018); Jenny Sanchez-Torres & Ian Miles, The Role
of Future-Oriented Technology Analysis in e-Government: A Systemic Review, 5
EUR. J. OF FUTURES RSCH. 1, 3 (2017).
201
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Figure 7. Simplified Example of a Graphical FTA Method204

A recent journal article revealed that Asia is leading in the
application of machine learning to conduct FTA using patent data.205
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean institutions hold the top ten spots
in total number of research articles published on this topic.206 So, it
204

See also Park, Lee & Jun, supra note 202 (describing a graphical network
methodology, as diagrammed in Figure 7, which begins with a data set for a
specific technology in contrast with Park et al. that begins with a data set from
within a company portfolio); Gabjo Kim & Jinwee Bae, A Novel Approach to
Forecast Promising Technology Through Patent Analysis, 117 TECH.
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 228, 229 (2017).
205
See Aristodemou & Tietze, supra note 203, at 39.
206
Id. at 39–40.
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is no surprise that China already possesses sophisticated FTA
capabilities.207 The newly passed regulation authorizing ubiquitous
data mining of internet traffic and the elimination of domestic VPNs
gives the Chinese a treasure trove of technology and business
information to mine for this purpose.208 The Chinese National
Science Library offers several categories of FTA services for
Chinese policymakers, research institutions, and Chinese
companies.209
In contrast, the United States ranks fourth in FTA research, with
U.S. authors comprising only eight percent of the research
contributions to the FTA field.210 A short review of publicly
available information reveals that a significant amount of military
technology forecasting still relies upon expert opinions, literature
reviews, and direct intelligence.211 While these methods remain
valuable, they leave China and those with robust FTA capabilities
in a better position to chart the innovation future. Only two
Department of Defense organizations could be identified—the
Office of Naval Research and the Defense Logistics Agency—with
FTA tools under development.212 These FTA tools utilize graphical
207

Xiwen Liu et al., Combining Scientometrics and Patent-Metrics for CTI
Service in R&D Decision-Making: Practices of Nation Science Library of CAS,
in ANTICIPATING FUTURE INNOVATION PATHWAYS THROUGH LARGE DATA
ANALYSIS 321 (Tugrul U. Daim et al. eds., 2016).
208
See Dickinson, supra note 124.
209
See Liu et al., supra note 207, at 323.
210
See Aristodemou & Tietze, supra note 203, at 40.
211
See, e.g., MICHAEL O’HANLON, FORECASTING CHANGE IN MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY, 2020-2040 1–2 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/FP_20181218_defense_advances_pt2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6Y9B-2X4U].
212
See Dallas Rosson, Predicting Part Lifecycles Utilizing Machine Learning
(2016) (Master’s Thesis, University of Washington) (on file with author),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315677947_PREDICTING_PART
LIFECYCLES_UTILIZING_MACHINE_LEARNING
[https://perma.cc/29H3G9TC]; Dennis Summers, Network Representation and Visualization to Assess
Obsolescence Issues, DEF. MFG. & MATERIAL SHORTAGES CONF. (2015); MICHAEL
S. NASH ET AL., INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSIS, A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO FOR DIMINISHING MANUFACTURING SOURCES AND
MATERIAL SHORTAGES (June 2018), https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/
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network analyses of patent data and scientometric data to predict
future technologies in the context of supply chain logistics and
lifecycle management.213 The Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (“DARPA”) has undertaken efforts to improve the
computing infrastructure necessary to perform such analyses.214 It
could not be determined whether DARPA also has an FTA
capability. A review of the National Intelligence Strategy of the
United States did not unearth any discussion of FTA tools or reveal
the use of such analyses in intelligence products.215 A review of
National Science Foundation funding reveals research in big data
and information data science generally, but did not specifically

publications/a/ar/a-research-and-development-investment-portfolio-for-diminishingmanufacturing-sources-and-material-shortages/d-9148.ashx [https://perma.cc/2UZ95MHY]. The fact that one could not identify machine learning FTA capabilities in
other DOD Departments does not mean they do not exist, just that they were not
searchable. The U.S. Air Force released an ambitious new science and technology
strategy in April 2019. U.S. A IR FORCE, SCIENCE AND T ECHNOLOGY
S TRATEGY : S TRENGTHENING USAF SCIENCE AND T ECHNOLOGY FOR 2030
AND B EYOND iii (2019), https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2019
%20SAF%20story%20attachments/Air%20Force%20Science%20and%20T
echnology%20Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7YV-Y9T4] Within that
strategy document, the Air Force states: “Instead of [reacting to others’ advances and]
looking where potential adversaries are heading, the Air Force scientific and technical
enterprise will predict where adversaries cannot easily go and then ensure the Air
Force gets there first.” Id. Although this statement implies use of FTA capabilities,
subsequent statements by Air Force officials suggest that no process yet exists to
establish which kinds of programs these efforts might consist of, and that research
decisions might be made after consultations with industry and stakeholders, indicating
that FTA is not used in the decision making process. Jon Harper, Air Force Unveils
Long-Awaited
S&T
Strategy,
NAT’L
DEF.
(Apr.
17,
2019),
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/4/17/breaking-air-forceunveils-long-awaited-st-strategy [https://perma.cc/ 44S7-LQLD].
213
NASH ET AL., supra note 212, at 2.
214
Extracting Insight from the Data Deluge Is a Hard-to-Do Must-Do, DARPA
(June 2, 2017), https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2017-06-02 [https://perma.cc/
JLB3-SWQM].
215
See generally DANIEL R. COATS, U.S. INTEL. CMTY., NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2019),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/ documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92XM-T2NY].
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reveal investment in the development of FTA tools of the type
presently under discussion.216
The Navy and Defense Logistics Agency’s tools are used to
manage the lifecycles of existing military technology.217 The
Authors’ research revealed no evidence that their FTA capabilities
are coupled with R&D efforts in ways other than supply chain
management and support of existing and near-term military
platforms. Utilization of FTA insights in this manner is not
inappropriate but is decoupled from execution of an Innovation
Warfare counterstrategy, wherein the prediction of future strategic
technologies has a broader national security purpose. Direct
coupling of FTA results to other innovation and intellectual property
management functions, such as patent acquisition, strategic
planning, basic research priorities, or technology transfer goals, was
not observed. Of the observed FTA capabilities, all were of the
exploratory type, and none were of the normative type. Both types
are valuable to Innovation Warfare countermeasures.
The United States, through the Department of Defense and/or
the Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, must urgently fund and further
develop both exploratory and normative FTA capabilities based on
machine learning and big data mining toolsets.218 The government
216

Harnessing the Data Revolution, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://www.nsf.gov/news/
special_reports/big_ideas/harnessing.jsp [https://perma.cc/2HPJ-J4ZL] (identifying ten
areas of primary focus for NSF research where one, “Harnessing the Data
Revolution,” focuses on improved education, development of necessary cyber and
IT infrastructure, and basic research in information science). The Authors
additionally reviewed the list of National Science Foundation (“NSF”) awards
given on the NSF website using a variety of search terms and by inspection of
recently granted awards, and they were unable to identify any focused research in
FTA tools.
217
See also Rosson, supra note 212; Summers, supra note 212; see generally NASH
ET AL., supra note 212 (reviewing publicly available research literature for Navy and
Defense Logistics Agency tools yields works similar to the above all focused on
lifecycle management; the fact the Authors’ research did not identify other FTA tools
and uses does not mean they do not exist, only that they are not currently published).
218
50 U.S.C. §§ 3030, 3191 (authorizing the Director of Science and
Technology within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to lead and
fund scientific advances in intelligence gathering as well as the awarding of
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must further design a mechanism for sharing and supplying the
results of FTA as input to the government’s Innovation Warfare
strategic planning process. Much like in the aftermath of 9/11, where
the government devised a way for agencies to share intelligence data
about potential terrorist threats, the government should develop
means for sharing the methodologies and the results of FTA
intelligence across agencies.219
In addition, the United States government must devise a
mechanism for making some form of FTA available to the private
sector. The Chinese government routinely provides FTA services to
its businesses and corporations, creating a significant competitive
advantage for Chinese firms.220 Specifically, the Chinese National
Science Library helps Chinese technology-based firms improve
their innovation capabilities, identify potential R&D partners,
identify innovation pathways, and otherwise conduct “industrial
technology and development strategizing.”221 These services are
provided in “13 key scientific fields,” although the literature fails to
list those fields.222
As documented below, other precedents exist for government
provision of technological competitive intelligence to the private
sector, albeit with earlier generation tools. Many patent offices,
including the Canadian and Scandinavian Patent Offices, routinely
perform such analyses for their fellow government agencies and
their constituent companies.223 The Nordic Patent Institute, a
educational grants for graduate studies in these areas); Id. § 3038 (authorizing the
Secretary of Defense to allocate funds to satisfy the intelligence needs of the
military as well as other departments and agencies).
219
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 458,
118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (creating the Information Sharing Environment managed
by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence upon the recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission).
220
See Liu et al., supra note 207, at 322–23.
221
Id. at 321.
222
Id. at 323.
223
See Jonathan Calof, Reflections on the Canadian Government in Competitive
Intelligence – Programs and Impacts, 19 FORESIGHT 1, 31–47 (Mar. 13, 2017); see
also CANADIAN INTEL. PROP. OFFICE, PATENT LANDSCAPE REPORT: SHALE OIL AND
GAS 2 (2016), https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/Shale
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combination of three Scandinavian Patent Offices, routinely offers
their patent examiners time and expertise on a consulting basis to
assist companies with a variety of issues.224 The Singapore Patent
Office has also started providing such a service to its companies.225
The World Intellectual Property Organization, a United Nations
organization, is mandated to provide patent landscape reports in
specific technology fields to developing countries.226
Although the U.S. Patent Office makes complete patent datasets
available for download, the Office does not make FTA tools or
services available to private U.S. citizens and corporations.227 On
information and belief, the U.S. Patent Office does not provide such
tools or analysis to the private sector, likely because first-generation
tools are readily available for purchase in the marketplace. The
Authors believe that unlike earlier generation analytic tools, the
computing infrastructure, and data mining competencies required to
perform modern FTA analysis make this capability unavailable to
all but the most sophisticated and well-capitalized entities. There is
little likelihood that sophisticated FTA tools will be available for
purchase in the marketplace in a reasonable time period. The United
States could consider licensing a less capable version of its FTA
tools to a private firm for commercialization.228 Until such time,
significant competitive advantage accrues to Chinese firms with
access to these enhanced FTA capabilities. One must be aware of
-Oil-Gas-report-May-2017.pdf/$file/Shale-Oil-Gas-report-May-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CJA5-2RRG] (exemplifying an industry competitive patent
analysis performed by a national patent office).
224
Nordic Experts in Global Prior Art Searching, NORDIC PAT. INST., www.npi.int
[https://perma.cc/6DJL-X3DY].
225
Growing Your Business with IP, INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF SING.,
https://www.ipos.gov.sg/growing-your-business-with-ip [https://perma.cc/KWW3JHFB].
226
Patent
Landscape
Reports,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/programs/patent_landscapes/
[https://perma.cc/C8RR-YD34] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
227
Bulk Data Products, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://
www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/bulk-data-products [https://perma.cc/MF2HN3FK] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
228
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (encouraging the licensing of inventions arising from
federally funded research).
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the possible future(s) if one is to take the actions necessary to chart
a course towards the preferred future and innovate competitively in
both the government and private sector.
B. Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and Scope
Federal R&D Spending to Seed the Innovations Necessary to
Attain the Preferred Future
Innovation creates the products and services that transition a
technological future from possibility to reality. One must invest in,
and undertake, the R&D activities necessary to create the associated
innovations in order to implement and drive towards a preferred
technological future. Research and development are the engines of
innovation.
The United States leads the world in R&D expenditures, but
China is on pace to catch up.229 Figure 8 compares the United States'
total expenditures on R&D to the expenditures made by China and
Europe. China made large and significant investments in R&D after
2001, with its total investment rapidly approaching the total R&D
investment in the U.S. economy. In 2016, the magnitude of Chinese
R&D investment in PPP dollars exceeded the combined R&D
investment of all European Union countries.

Figure 8. Total R&D Investment in Current PPP Dollars230

229
230

Irwin, supra note 46.
See COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 53.
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The allocation of R&D investment dollars has increasingly
shifted from the public to the private sector in the U.S. economy
over the last several decades.231As seen in Figure 9, at its peak in
1966, federal R&D spending made up sixty-seven percent of the
total expenditures on R&D in the economy. By 2018, this
percentage had dropped to twenty-two percent.

Figure 9. Changes in the Proportion of Federal and Private Sector
R&D Expense232

The reallocation of R&D spending from the federal government
to the private sector has many benefits, but also introduces some
risks. These risks include the increased susceptibility of unhardened
private sector facilities and information to unsanctioned access in a
globally interconnected world.233 These risks also include market
failures which underproduce the type of innovations needed by the
military. As with the space program, profit-driven firms may be less
231

JOHN F. SARGENT, JR., CONG. RSCH SERV., R44307, U.S. RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING AND PERFORMANCE: FACT SHEET, 1–2 (2020), https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44307.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8G-AXPJ].
232
Id.
233
Jeanne Suchodolski, Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in the
Transportation Sector: An Examination of Regulatory and Private Law
Approaches with Recommendations for Needed Reforms, 20 N.C. J. OF L. & TECH.
121, 130 (2018) (noting that cybersecurity issues must now be managed across a
global logistics and supply chain; and additionally noting that shared service
models and outsourcing introduces additional business security risks and
vulnerabilities).

DEC. 2020]

Innovation Warfare

229

inclined to undertake fundamental, early-stage, or high-risk research
of the type not likely to produce commercial products in a viable
time frame.
Although federal R&D spending has increased in real dollars, as
shown in Figure 10, federal funding, as a percentage of GDP, has
steadily declined with the ending of the Cold War.234 This “peace
dividend” also coincided with the reallocation of the nation’s
research spending to the private sector.

Figure 10. Federal R&D as a Share of GDP235

Federal R&D expenditures have had an influential effect on the
pace of innovation in the economy.236 Figure 11 illustrates this
correlation. Even though total R&D spending continues to increase
as a percentage of GDP, TFP has declined as federal spending has
decreased.237 While correlation does not equal causation, studies
have shown that U.S. government research has been critical in the
development of many of the technology revolutions of the twentieth

234
NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018 (2018),
https://nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/assets/nsb20181.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W9HUPRE].
235
Id.
236
MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING
PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC SECTOR MYTHS 68–70 (2013), https://nsf.gov/statistics/
2018/nsb20181/assets/nsb20181.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA57-RCQ3].
237
Data compiled from National Science Board and Bureau of Labor and
Statistics.
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century.238 One study indicated that approximately thirty percent of
all granted U.S. patents derive from federally funded research.239

Figure 11. TFP relative to federal R&D and total R&D
expenditures240

Evidence of the importance of the state’s role in innovation goes
beyond financing basic research. The state’s role additionally
includes the financing of applied research and the development of
markets in fundamental new areas such as: IT, semiconductors,
space, nanotech, alternative energy, and medicine through DARPA,
ARPA-E, NIH, SFIR, orphan drugs, etc.241 The Apollo Program not
only put a man on the moon, but it financed an era of U.S.
technological superiority.242 The government has the unique ability
238

See, e.g., MAZZUCATO, supra note 236.
L. Flemming et al., Government-Funded Research Increasingly Fuels
Innovation, 364 SCI. 1139, 1139–41 (2019).
240
Data compiled from National Science Board and Bureau of Labor and
Statistics.
241
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 236, at 79–90.
242
Robert Gallagher, How the Apollo Program Produced Economic Wealth, 14
EIR 24, 24–29 (1987). But see Erika K. Carlson, Apollo Boosted the Economy,
Just Not the Way You Think, ASTRONOMY (May 31, 2019),
239
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to invest in early-stage technology areas that might otherwise
constitute too speculative a financial undertaking for a private
firm.243 Preliminary development of early-stage technologies, up to
the point where private actors can invest, apportions innovation risk
and innovation labor in an economically efficient way.244
Additionally, U.S. research grants and investments have been
instrumental in building public-private partnerships, and the
corresponding formation of geographic concentrations of
specialized innovation expertise.245 Federal Cold War-era spending
on research concentrated research dollars at a few major
universities, thereby seeding the formation of innovation clusters in
Silicon Valley, Boston’s Route 128, and Austin, Texas.246 Examples
from Silicon Valley alone abound. The research that led to Google
was federally funded.247 Apple’s iPhone relied on key technologies
created using federal funding.248
Investments in federal R&D spending are, therefore, critical to
add capacity to America’s overall innovation and R&D efforts and
to outperform Chinese spending on R&D innovation along future

https://astronomy.com/news/2019/05/apollo-boosted-the-economy-just-not-theway-you-think [https://perma.cc/53XZ-RTZA] (documenting an ongoing
research project by academics Alexander Whalley and Shawn Kantor to assess
the economic impact of the Apollo Program).
243
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 236 at 63–70.
244
Id.
245
See also Mazzucato, supra note 236, at 101; see generally STATE OF
INNOVATION: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
(Fred L. Block & Matthew R. Keller eds., Paradigm Publishers 2011) (finding
that between 1971-2006, 88% of the most important innovations—as rated by
R&D Magazine’s annual awards—have been dependent on federal research
support).
246
See O’MARA, supra note 25, at 93–103.
247
Nafeez Ahmed, How the CIA Made Google, part 1, MEDIUM INSURGE
INTELL. (Jan. 22, 2015), https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/how-the-ciamade-google-e836451a959e [https://perma.cc/VW22-4XRZ] (noting that what
eventually became Google’s search engine was in part funded by National Science
Foundation grants from the Digital Library Initiative).
248
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 236, at 93–103.
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technology trajectories.249 Reliance on increased private sector
spending is insufficient to ensure investment in early-stage and
emerging technologies and to ensure America has a position on the
technology roadmaps of the future. A reexamination of the
recommendations in Table 1 reveals a strong consensus on this
point, with more than half of the total recommendations advocating
for an expansion of the country’s R&D capacity. Agencies and
Departments should allocate between 0.5% and 1% of their budgets
to research in those technology areas relevant to securing the
preferred technology future(s) whether via direct research or via
research grant programs.
R&D investments by the Department of Defense are particularly
impactful. Figure 12 diagrams the current allocation of federal R&D
funds. The Department of Defense funds nearly half of all federal
research, hence its research programs are not only vital to advancing
the technological superiority of the military, but also to underwriting
research in key technology areas for the economy as a whole.

Figure 12. 2019 Federal R&D Expenditures250

249

DOD’s Role in Competing with China: Testimony before the House Armed Servs.
Comm., 116th Cong. 3–4 (Jan. 15, 2020) (statement of Michele A. Flournoy, Former
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy), https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/4/
4/44fbef3d-138c-4a0a-b3a9-2f05c898578f/0E4943A5BFAEDA465D485A166FABC
F5F.20200115-hasc-michele-flournoy-statement-vfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLP5D2JU].
250
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FY 2020 BUDGET
CHAPTER 21 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
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Despite this reality, a recent study showed Department of
Defense R&D spending fails to fully align with the emerging
technologies prioritized by the National Defense Strategy.251 The
Department of Defense has yet to make serious commitments to
investing in those key technologies.252 Recently, the White House
issued guidance to the heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, including the Department of Defense, directing specific
actions to remedy this state of affairs.253 In a Memorandum dated
August 2020, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
defined R&D budget priorities for fiscal year 2022.254 The
Memorandum identified five R&D spending priorities and four
supporting actions Agencies must fund in the coming budgetary
cycle.255
Even when the Department of Defense does expend funds on
prioritized technology areas, fifty-nine percent of those funds go to
just ten contractors.256 These ten contractors consist of the usual
defense industry specialists, as shown in Table 2. While these
defense industry partners no doubt have immense capabilities, such
spending patterns are not likely to generate new economic clusters
of expertise. These spending patterns also limit the military’s access
to innovations of the type generated by young start-ups and
entrepreneurial firms. There exists a need to diversify R&D spending
ap_21_research-fy2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBS8-TX7N] (calculating numbers in
chart based on tabulated amounts).
251
GOVINI, AMERICA’S ERODING TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE: NATIONAL DEFENSE
STRATEGY RDT&E PRIORITIES IN AN ERA OF GREAT-POWER COMPETITION WITH
CHINA 3 (2020) https://www.govini.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Govini_NDSRDTE-Priorities-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/99TF-EUYR].
252
See DOD’s Role in Competing with China: Testimony before the House
Armed Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. 6 (Jan. 15, 2020) (statement of Andrew Hunter,
Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and Senior Fellow, International
Security Program, CSIS), https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/4/ 4/44fbef3d138c-4a0a-b3a9-2f05c898578f/0E4943A5BFAEDA465D485A166FABCF5F.20200
115-hasc-michele-flournoy-statement-vfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLP5-D2JU].
253
See VOUGHT, supra note 183 (directing agencies to prioritize spending in
five key research areas and expanding those areas to include public health).
254
Id. at 2.
255
Id.
256
GOVINI, supra note 251.
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to access early-stage technologies at less traditional firms.257 The
White House appears to have recognized this fact since the National
Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies advocates for
increased collaboration with the private sector and academia, as well
as a stated willingness to leverage private capital and expertise to
maintain the national security innovation base.258
Table 2: Top Ten Firms Receiving DOD Funding for Research in Key
Technology Areas259

A robust Innovation Warfare strategy consistently aligns
government R&D spending, particularly Department of Defense
R&D spending, with the preferred technological future(s).
Accomplishing this task requires a strong focus on technology
governance and means for continuously evaluating the capabilities
and effectiveness of the R&D machinery. Application of FTA
toolsets can be especially helpful in constructing feedback loops to
assess R&D performance and infrastructure needs.260 Figure 13
diagrams these feedback loops. These feedback loops can assess
whether sufficient innovation activity is occurring along the
preferred technology roadmaps or whether additional funding or
emphasis areas are needed to maintain progress along the desired
course. For example, for those critical technologies identified by the
257

Id.; see also James Serbu, Navy Picks 5 Sites for ‘tech bridges’ to Push Fleet
Innovation, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 5, 2019) https://federalnewsnetwork.
com/navy/2019/09/navy-picks-5-sites-for-tech-bridges-to-push-fleet-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/9QFL-P5Y7] (describing Navy initiatives to identify and
partner with nontraditional sources of innovation). In the Authors’ experience,
many firms, including some large tech companies, lack familiarity with federal
contracting and view the overhead burdensome, leaving the Department of
Defense with limited visibility into and limited access to the innovations created
by such firms.
258
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155, at 7.
259
GOVINI, supra note 251, at 18 (Figure 12).
260
See JEFFREY ALEXANDER ET. AL, BIG DATA AND THE FUTURE OF R&D
MANAGEMENT: A PRIMER ON BIG DATA FOR INNOVATION 14–15 (2017).
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National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies, as
technologies in which the United States must lead, the feedback
loops in Figure 13 can assist in tracking relevant innovation activity
against the goal. These feedback loops are also useful for evaluating
the strength and performance of the innovation infrastructure and
R&D ecosystem. In particular, FTA tools can help identify R&D
partners, detect concentrations of prolific inventors, assess human
capital and education needs, and evaluate overall capabilities in the
context of prioritized critical technology fields.

Figure 13. Feedback and Control Loops for Innovation Process
Optimization

The United States is a free market economy with a bias towards
believing actions taken freely within that economy will naturally
produce optimum results. Advocating for proactive management
and measurement of federal R&D spending to achieve a preferred
future(s) does not equate to advocating for top-down central
planning of the economy. Rather, proactive management of federal
R&D spending should include mechanisms that couple federal
research investment to Innovation Warfare strategy. Tracking the
effectiveness of those investments in creating the innovations that
implement the preferred technological future(s) provides situational
awareness and the insight to adjust course as necessary.
C. Secure Technology Control Position – Intellectual Property as
an Armament of Innovation Warfare
Seizing the preferred technological future(s) goes beyond
defining and acquiring the innovations needed to implement it.
Seizing the preferred technological future(s) also means influencing
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others to accept or support the attainment of that future in lieu of a
less preferred alternative future(s). In private industry, commercial
entities are well versed at utilizing multiple forms of control
positions to gain and hold a strategic advantage over competitors, as
each competes for future markets.261 These control positions include
first-mover advantages, economies of scale, superior distribution
networks, preferential positions in the supply chain, and intellectual
property.262 On a national scale, control positions might include
acquiring a monopoly or sole access to a key resource such as
helium, sand, or subject matter experts.263 There are multiple forms
and types of control positions useful for safeguarding and securing
the ability to influence others in the adoption and attainment of a
preferred technological future(s). Each has value and importance in
Innovation Warfare, but the following discussion is limited to just a
single type: intellectual property.
Intellectual property is a useful concept for the development of
technology-based control positions.264 Intellectual property exists at
the intersection of technology and the set of possible control
261

See, e.g., MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 11–15 (1985).
Id.
263
See Carmen Chappell & Jordan Smith, The Worldwide Helium Shortage
Affects Everything from MRIs to Rockets— Here’s Why, CNBC (June 21, 2019)
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/21/helium-shortage-why-the-worlds-supply-isdrying-up.html [https://perma.cc/5MXM-HYTQ] (stating that the United States
controls most of the world’s helium supply); see also Vince Beiser, He Who
Controls the Sand: The Mining ‘Mafias’ Killing Each Other to Build Cities,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/feb/28/
sand-mafias-killing-each-other-build-cities
[https://perma.cc/YK8W-WE97]
(describing how sand is a critical resource in cement—a necessity in building
construction—and spurring a mad race to dominate sand distribution and supply);
see also Danny Lewis, Why the U.S. Government Brought Nazi Scientists to
America After World War II, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 16, 2016)
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-us-government-brought-naziscientists-america-after-world-war-ii-180961110/ [https://perma.cc/9KXM-7RBQ]
(describing why 88 Nazi scientists were brought to America so that the U.S. could
acquire German technology but also to prevent the Soviets from acquiring the
scientists).
264
See ULF PETRUSSON, RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION 390 (2016) (describing
the mapping of intellectual property-based control positions in the technology
context).
262
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positions, as diagrammed in Figure 14. Properly wielded intellectual
property can be a powerful mechanism with which to ensure the
desired technological future is attained.

Figure 14. Intellectual Property Exists at the
Intersection of Technology and Control Positions

There are multiple forms of intellectual property, and each is
useful for protecting different aspects of innovations.265 All forms of
intellectual property possess value as a means to prevent others from
using innovation without permission. Patents are the strongest and
most familiar of these intellectual property rights and are commonly
used to build technology-based control positions.266 Although the
265

Copyrights protect written works, software code and databases. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332. Trademarks protect avatars, comic book characters, and
business names. Performance rights protect musicians’ recorded works. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 114. And, patents protect useful and novel inventions. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 100–101. The precise scope and legal definition vary by country, but
international treaties provide for some minimum commonality and protection
standards. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). In some
jurisdictions, additional forms of intellectual property exist. In the United States,
for example, trade secret rights protect company proprietary information, such as
the formula for Coca-Cola that derives its value precisely from the fact that the
formula remains private. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836, 1839. Not all countries have
trade secret rights.
266
See SUZANNE S. HARRISON & PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, EDISON IN THE
BOARDROOM REVISITED 30–33 (2011)
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following discussion is further limited to patents, the concepts and
principles described apply to all categories of intellectual property.
Patents help innovative entities straddle the dimension of time.
Savvy entities protect innovation value streams both in the present
and in the future via a portfolio of patents. Many leaders think of
intellectual property, and patents in particular, as simply a necessary
defensive expenditure.267 But experienced leaders realize that
intellectual property is a type of real option that connects current
R&D investments to future benefits inclusive of the ability to control
and manage outcomes at a later point in time.268 The difference
between these two points of view is significant.
Under U.S. law, a patent is a right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention.269 These rights
mean that others must have the patent owner’s permission to
practice the invention claimed in the patent. Therefore, the patent
owner “controls” how the patented technology is to be utilized and
holds the option to exercise that right throughout the life of the
patent. Patents are, therefore, real options on control positions, or
simply for ease of discussion, control positions.270
The real option nature of patents, however, nonetheless provides
key insights on their optimum use as control positions. Entities file
patent applications hopeful that the resulting patent may prove to be
of some use or value in the future.271 Often one or more of these
future anticipated uses of a patent, such as licensing, technology
transfer, influencing standards-setting or other technology adoption,
267

Id.
Id.
269
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
270
See generally Eduardo Schwartz, Patents and R&D as Real Options (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 10114, 2003), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w10114/w10114.pdf [https://perma.cc/P884-888A]
(developing a “simulation approach to value patents and patent-protected R&D
projects based on the Real Options approach”); PHILIPP N. BAECKER, REAL
OPTIONS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CAPITAL BUDGETING UNDER
IMPERFECT PATENT PROTECTION (2007) (describing the use and management of
a portfolio of patents as real options on R&D investments).
271
See HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 266.
268
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or stopping infringement, fails to materialize.272 In such a case, the
patent option is null. But, if one of these uses were to come about,
the patent option is “called” and the patent often assumes a
significant amount of value through that use.273 That value, or future
return, varies depending on the precise use and may not materialize
at all.274 Thus, not all patents are equally valuable. Entities,
therefore, try to file as many patents to obtain as many options to
assert a control position in the future as possible.275
The first and most obvious means of using patents as control
positions is to obtain them at all. Every such control position a U.S.
entity obtains is one that its adversaries do not obtain. In the context
of Innovation Warfare, patents can be used to own and control
relevant technology future(s) for U.S. interests. Either a U.S.
company can own and control a relevant patent asset, or the U.S.
government can own and control the patent asset. In either scenario,
a U.S. entity, not an adversary, owns and controls the patent asset.
Patent portfolio size need not, however, be unbounded. Nor,
does there exist a magic number to own. In the Authors’ experience,
different industries and technologies utilize patents differently. For
this reason, caution must be exercised when attempting to establish
a desired number of patent assets solely by reference to the size of
the R&D investment. The right number of patents, or control
positions, to own is both a statistical and financial question. In an
ideal world, an entity wants to own enough patents so that when they
reach into their portfolio in response to a given scenario, they would
be statistically likely to find an executable option. Realistically, the
size of the portfolio becomes limited by the financial costs of
acquiring it and maintaining it.
In Innovation Warfare, the strategic objective for acquiring
patents can be more precise, and hence more precision can be
obtained in defining, scoping, and evaluating the portfolio, by
coupling the patent acquisition efforts to the FTA and R&D
272

Id.
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
273
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initiatives previously described. White space is often defined as the
emergent technological areas just beginning to be populated by
inventions.276 By patenting in white space areas, one begins to own
and control the technological future. From the previous discussion
of the FTA analysis, one can see that FTA serves as a sophisticated
and systematic means to chart white spaces of strategic interest.
From the previous discussion of R&D investments, one can see the
federal government, and in particular the Department of Defense,
has an outsized role in funding the research likely to generate
inventions in these strategic white space areas. Thus, the federal
government, and in particular the Department of Defense, plays an
important role in securing the patent control positions most relevant
to an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy.
Table 3 lists, by Agencies, the approximate number of patents
acquired by the U.S. government in 2019. The number of overseas
patents applied for and issued to the United States is not given in
Table 3. Agencies who originate patent applications do not also
always possess the authority to file and prosecute patent applications
overseas.277 These Agencies make recommendations to the
Department of Commerce, which then files such cases in
appropriate jurisdictions as desired.278 The totals provided in Table
3 are consistent with yearly totals for the previous five years. The
Department of Defense receives more than half of all government
patents, and the Navy receives the largest percentage of these. In
light of this discussion and the proposals to follow, government
agencies, and especially the Department of Defense, may wish to
reevaluate and recommit to patenting activity.

276

As practitioners in this area the Authors have relayed their understanding of
the use of this term from their professional experience.
277
3 C.F.R. §§ 1943–1948 Comp. 651–52 (2020) (stating that all government
departments and agencies who acquire title to inventions shall inform the
Department of Commerce; and the Department of Commerce shall determine
whether, and in what foreign jurisdictions the United States shall file foreign
patent applications).
278
Id.
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Table 3: Approximate Number of Patents Issued to U.S. Government 2019279

In an Innovation Warfare race with China to secure control
positions on the technological future, a numbers game is being
played over time. Chinese nationals currently file more patent
applications than nationals of any other country.280 According to a
recent study, “[i]f women, minorities, and children from lowincome families were to invent at the same rate as white men from
high-income (top twenty percent) families, the rate of innovation in
America would quadruple.”281 In recognition of this fact, Congress
passed the Success Act in 2018 to promote the inclusion of
underutilized groups, specifically women, minorities, and veterans,
into the invention and patenting process.282 Veterans comprise
approximately forty-seven percent of the civilian workforce at the
Department of Defense.283 For this additional reason, the
Department of Defense may have significant opportunities to
expand its patenting activities. Acquiring patents and putting control
position options into U.S. hands and away from adversaries is, by
itself, a win for the United States.
279

The numbers provided in Table 3 were generated from an assignee search of
the U.S. Patent Office database using online search tools and are believed
approximate but representative of the actual numbers.
280
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WIPO FACTS AND FIGURES 2019 12 (2019),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_943_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KZQ9-2VA3].
281
Alex Bell et al., Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of
Exposure to Innovation, 134 Q. J. ECON. 647, 653 (2018).
282
Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing Engineering and Science
Success Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-273, § 3, 132 Stat. 4158.
283
U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE BRANCH FISCAL YEAR 2014 3 (2015), https://www.fedshirevets.gov/
veterans-council/veteran-employment-data/employment-of-veterans-in-thefederal-executive-branch-fy2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YA6-KX6A].
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Once obtained, a variety of tactics exist to exercise the option on
and to extract strategic advantage from patents. Licensing is one
such tactic. For a myriad of reasons, this avenue has the greatest
promise in an Innovation Warfare context. Specifically, judicious
use of licensing activities by the federal government can promote
U.S. innovation and foster the growth of emerging industries. For
precisely these reasons, Congress directed that federally funded
research be patented and licensed.284
In compliance with Congress’s wishes, the Department of
Defense includes Technology Transfer Offices within each agency
responsible for the licensing of defense technology.285 Existing
Department of Defense licensing programs have produced
noteworthy and measurable outcomes on the U.S. economy.286 To
make licensing a truly effective Innovation Warfare counterstrategy,
however, requires augmentation of current licensing practices
coupled with direction to align those efforts with the strategic
objectives. Current licensing transactions mostly consist of the
consummation of ad hoc targets of opportunity, untethered to the
types of strategic goals articulated herein, and conceived and
implemented in the context of a single deal.

284

Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (establishing that “[i]t is the policy
and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization
of inventions arising from federally supported research or development”).
285
Id. § 209 (describing the authority and policies for licensing of federally
owned inventions); Instructions from Dep’t of Defense, DoD Technology
Transfer (T2) Program, at Instruction 5535.8 (May 14, 1999),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/553508p.pdf?
ver=2018-10-22-082514-847 [https://perma.cc/E5WM-ZV8U] (implementing the
policies and procedures for licensing Department of Defense Technology Transfer
programs and allocating responsibility for this function to the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering).
286
See TECHLINK & UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF BUS., NATIONAL ECONOMIC
IMPACTS FROM DOD LICENSE AGREEMENTS WITH U.S. INDUSTRY 5 (2018),
https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/what-we-do/research/technologytransfer/DoD-Licensing-Study-2017.pdf?ver=2019-08-07-133426-037
[https://perma.cc/3VUA-795B] (finding that as of 2017, existing DoD licensing
programs had produced $58 billion in total economic impact nationwide, $27 billion
in new product sales, and created 214,791 jobs).
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Three more sophisticated licensing practices offer more
effective alternatives. Each of these three licensing alternatives
utilizes patent-based control positions to build strategic openness.287
Strategic openness promotes attainment of the preferred
technological future(s) by influencing and enabling others to adopt
the technologies underlying it.
The first of these alternatives, and with a past history of success,
involves revitalization of patent pools. The United States
successfully utilized patent pools to ensure the viability of the
emerging radio and aviation industries.288 Patent pools gather those
patents required to participate in a given industry into a single lot
available for license.289 Patent pools are thus pro-competition and
economically efficient. The patent owner receives royalties for the
patents placed into the pool, while industry participants receive a
license in exchange for those royalties.290 Pools have the effect of
de-risking entry into new technology areas since the likelihood of
being sued for patent infringement is reduced. Patent pools currently
exist for DVDs, MPEG, and RFID technologies, to name but a
few.291 In industries without these cross-license pooling
arrangements, firms must negotiate for needed licenses on an
inefficient, piecemeal basis.292 In industries without patent pools,
and where patents are abundant, firms face an increased risk of
expensive patent infringement suits.

287

Strategic openness influences or enables the adoption of a preferred
technology by granting others the ability to “see” or “use” it. See XIAN XU ET AL.,
STRATEGIC OPENNESS AND OPEN STRATEGY 50–84 (David Seidl, Georg von
Krogh & Richard Whittington eds., 2019).
288
Robert Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The
Case of Patent Pools 28 (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/pools.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PF3J-WACJ];
Kevin Closson, Patent Pools, SPIE (Sept. 30, 2009), https://spie.org/news/spieprofessional-magazine-archive/2009-october/patent-pools?SSO=1
[https://perma.cc/423A-UV6D].
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id.
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Patent pools thus encourage United States entrants into
emerging technology areas while creating a preference for the
particular technologies covered by the pool. Even if Chinese
companies were licensed under the pool, those Chinese firms would
still be advancing a preferred technological future as embodied by
the technologies and license conditions of the pool.
Public-private sector cooperation on the formation of patent
pools in next generation technologies should be further investigated
as a means to establish control positions and foster industry growth
in those technologies. The creation of such pools similar to that used
for radio creates a stronger American innovation ecosystem.
The second advanced licensing concept bears even more
promise. This relatively new model is known as “License on
Transfer” (“LOT”).293 The model operates on a concept similar to
vaccines. In the context of an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy, a
LOT licensing model works to “inoculate” U.S. industry from
patents acquired by a non-U.S. entity. More specifically, for patents
derived from U.S. government-funded research, whether held by a
private contractor, grantee, or the U.S. government, the patentee
would sign an agreement pledging that if the patent asset were ever
transferred to a non-U.S. or non-ally entity, any U.S. company
would immediately obtain a non-exclusive license under that patent.
In this way, the U.S.-funded invention process would protect U.S.
innovators from future lawsuits, should that patent subsequently
wind up in the portfolio of an adversary or an adversary’s firms.294
293

Ken Seddon, Invest in Growth: How LOT Network Addresses the PAE
Problem,
LOTNETWORK
(June
5,
2017),
https://lotnet.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Introduction-of-LOT-2.0-For-Startups_NonLegal-v5.1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VT5T-SYMC].
294
Although 35 U.S.C. § 209 specifies certain preconditions for licensing
federally owned inventions, the License on Transfer (“LOT”) concepts discussed
here go further. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 209(b) states that licenses to federally
owned inventions are normally granted only to those who will manufacture
substantially in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 2019(b). The Authors believe that
the LOT provisions could be triggered even if the licensee or their successors in
interest were not in breach of this provision. Likewise, 35 U.S.C. § 209(d)(1)
contains a grant-back license enabling any federal agency to practice the invention
or products embodying it on behalf of the United States. The LOT terms could be
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The LOT model requires further investigation. The United
States could include the necessary licensing terms in its patent
licenses without additional legislation. The acquisition process
could make such commitments voluntary in exchange for more
favorable treatment, but mandating such terms may require
additional legislation or modification of existing regulation. In both
cases, more thorough legal analysis and implementation plans are
required.
The third alternative licensing model is the Library model or
patent shield model.295 This model ensures start-ups are protected
from predatory patent lawsuits.296 In the Library model, a large
number of patents are aggregated either by purchasing them or by
aggregating the portfolios of many participants.297 Small businesses
or start-ups in emerging technologies of strategic interest enroll in
the Library program.298 Should a Library member be threatened with
litigation by another entity, they can search the Library portfolio for
any patents that might be asserted in a countersuit or otherwise be
useful in defeating the litigation efforts.299 If any such patents exist
within the Library, the relevant patent assets are transferred to the
start-up; or optionally, the start-up receives an exclusive license that
enables them to assert that patent in a countersuit.300 The Library
concept is an additional means through which the federal
government could incubate and protect the indigenous innovation

drafted to trigger license rights to both the government and U.S. private entities
upon the occurrence of certain specified events. In addition, LOT terms could be
made a part of federal contracting such that they would apply to any patents owned
and developed by private entities in connection with those contracts. Other
implementations of the LOT concept are possible.
295
Suzanne Harrison et al., Licensing 2.0: Corporation’s New Approach to IP
Monetization, Panel Discussion at Licensing Executive Society Annual Meeting
(Oct. 23, 2017).
296
Id.
297
Id.
298
Id.
299
Id.
300
Id.

246

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 2

ecosystem, especially in strategic technology areas along future
technological pathways.301
Whatever the licensing model, the generation and maintenance
of a patent portfolio is key to gaining and leveraging control
positions to advantage American industry. Furthermore, the rights
embodied in that portfolio must be coupled with existing platforms
or products and must also constitute a series of carefully placed
strategic bets representative of emerging technological future(s).
Coupling a robust patent portfolio with creative licensing is a
winning tactic in the Innovation Warfare battlespace.302

301
Other additional models exist but the three most promising models have
been presented in the main text. Chief among these additional models are patent
buying funds. These funds protect indigenous companies in emerging industries
from coercive foreign technology transfer activities. The purpose of the fund is to
buy patents to be asserted against companies who have forced those indigenous
companies to license their intellectual property. Korea’s Intellectual Discovery is
one of the most prolific patent buying funds established for this purpose. About
ID, INTELL. DISCOVERY, http://www.i-discovery.com/site/en/overview/aboutid.jsp
[https://perma.cc/KUX5-JXKG] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). Significant additional
research would be required to evaluate the benefits and legal authorities for
federal government agencies to establish or to participate in such funds.
302
Patent infringement lawsuits are an additional control position tactic. Patent
infringement lawsuits can be brought in federal court before the International
Trade Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B). Patent
infringement lawsuits, however, present challenges that make them less attractive
than licensing as an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy. Lawsuits are incredibly
expensive and resource intensive. In the federal government, the Department of
Justice has responsibility for filing and litigating patent infringement cases.
Unlike a licensing-based approach, implementing a litigation-based
counterstrategy would require significant financial commitment and coordination
across government agencies. Relying on private parties to execute litigation
tactics in the context of Innovation Warfare is also not likely to achieve significant
strategic outcomes. Not only are private parties intimidated by China into
forgoing this option, but private entities are driven to maximize profitability.
Private entities get graded on maximizing shareholder value not on the strategic
goals of an Innovation Warfare defense. Only in rare and highly impactful
situations is litigation warranted.
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D. Organize to Win
The good news is that within each government agency, the
component pieces and the requisite statutory authority exist to
execute on the recommendations contained in this Article. On the
agency level, such as within the Department of Defense, those
pieces need only be organized and managed for strategic and
synergistic effect. On a broader level, the Innovation Warfare threat
demands, as others have also suggested, an integrated government
approach.303
Albert Einstein once said, “[i]n the middle of difficulty lies
opportunity.”304 The fundamental values that Americans hold dear
are under attack and require new and different strategic thinking and
organizational mandates to combat this new threat. Innovation
Warfare as prosecuted by the Chinese amounts to a malign foreign
influence campaign as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 3021.305 This
conclusion rests the overall coordination of the response and
counterstrategy within the province of the National Security
Council.306 While the concept of “malign foreign influence
campaigns” is currently thought of in the context of social media
and election interference, the statutory definition of that phrase is
much more encompassing.307 Per the statute, “malign foreign
influence operations and campaigns” means the “coordinated, direct
or indirect application of national, diplomatic, informational,
military, economic, business, corruption, educational, and other
capabilities by hostile foreign powers to affect attitudes, behaviors,
decisions, or outcomes within the United States.”308 Innovation
Warfare certainly meets this definition, and the National Security
Council should be tasked with coordinating the interagency
response at the highest levels of government, subject to the
303

See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2, at 25.
ALICE CALAPRICE, THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 321 (2000).
305
See 50 U.S.C. § 3021(h).
306
Id. § 3021(g)(1) (“The President shall designate an employee of the National
Security Council to be responsible for the coordination of the interagency process
for combating malign foreign influence operations and campaigns.”).
307
See id. § 3021(h).
308
Id.
304

248

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 2

provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act, as described
below.
Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020, has also directed action to be taken.309 Section
1239 of the Act directs the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of State, in coordination with appropriate government officials, to
provide an updated strategy to “counter the threat of malign
influence operations by the People’s Republic of China.”310 This
updated strategy must include actions to counter seven specific
elements, including: security measures, information operations,
cyber measures, political and diplomatic measures, financial
measures, energy security measures, and promotion of values.311 As
defined by the Act, an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy as
described herein falls within the bounds of the political measures
element.312 Congress also directed the organizational design, for
implementing the resulting strategy, be defined.313
Congress further directed the Secretary of Defense, acting
through the Office of Net Assessment, to conduct studies on
competitive strategies with respect to China.314 Innovation Warfare
309
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 11692 §§ 1239, 1253(c), 133 Stat. 1198, 1655, 1671 (2019) (directing the Secretary
of Defense, through the Office of Net Assessment, to develop no fewer than three
long-term competitive strategies with respect to the Peoples Republic of China to
shape strategic competition to the advantage of the United States; and to deliver a
report on same to Congress).
310
Id. § 1239(b) (updating and expands to include China tasking to counter
malign influence campaigns as previously assigned pursuant to the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018).
311
Id. § 1239(a); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
§ 1239A.
312
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 1239A (stating
“[p]rograms and activities to enhance the resilience of United States democratic
institutions and infrastructure at the national and subnational levels.”).
313
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 1239(b)(2)
(stating that “[a] description of the interagency organizational structure and
procedures for coordinating the implementation of the comprehensive strategy for
countering malign influence . . . be provided”).
314
Id. §§ 1239(b)(2), 1253(c)(1). The Office of Net Assessment is the
Department of Defense internal “think tank” created in 1973 by Richard Nixon
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as a competitive strategy prosecuted by China, and against which
counter-competitive strategies are needed, definitely falls within this
mandate. Congress directed that no fewer than three
counter-competitive strategies be developed and reported to
Congress by December 19, 2020.315
At the uppermost levels of government, therefore, clear
authority and delegation of responsibility exist to counter the
Innovation Warfare threat. The Secretaries of Defense and State
have the primary responsibility for further defining and developing
specific
Innovation
Warfare
threat
doctrines
and
counterstrategies.316 The National Security Council has the
responsibility to coordinate implementation of the strategic
response, and to coordinate information sharing between the White
House, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and
various sister agencies. In the context of an Innovation Warfare
response, these sister agencies include, at a minimum: the
Department of Commerce, the National Science Foundation, the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the U.S.
Trade Representative, the Small Business Administration, and the
Department of Education. The National Security Council, through
the Office of Director for National Intelligence and the Director of
Science and Technology, should also cooperate with: (1) the
Department of Defense in the funding and development of FTA
tools, and (2) with the Department of Commerce in making some
version of those tools available in the private sector.
Beyond setting and orchestrating Innovation Warfare
counterstrategies at a whole of government level, within the
that looks 20 to 30 years in the future. See Humberto Enrique Lopez Arellano, Net
Assessment: Creating an Institutional Capacity and General Process To Perform
It, 17–18 (June 2017) (Thesis, M.A., Naval Postgraduate School),
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046458.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6PV-8246]
(discussing the historical origins and purpose of the Office).
315
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 1253(c)(2).
316
Id. § 1239(b) (updating the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018, by expanding the Secretary of State and Department of Defense’s role
to include the development of strategies to counter the malign influence activities
of China).
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Department of Defense there exist numerous additional
opportunities to respond to the Innovation Warfare threat across
different time dimensions. Recognition that Department of Defense
priorities and organizational design may need modification is
growing.317 Opportunities include mobilization and reorganization
of existing functional units and capabilities to better align with the
counterstrategy. These opportunities additionally include tasking
existing functional units and bases of expertise to facilitate capture
of intellectual property control positions.
More specifically, each Department must first articulate an
intellectual property strategy logically connected to and supported
by the current technology strategy, preferably focusing on the zero
to ten-year time frame. The intellectual property strategy should
ideally include patenting goals and technology transfer goals. In
addition to existing guidance, the technology transfer goals should
be coupled with activities that push strategic and early-stage
roadmap technologies into the American innovation base. The
technology transfer strategy should additionally evaluate and
incorporate the novel licensing approaches described above. These
activities will make significant progress in the implementation of a
fully integrated Intellectual Property Management decision process,
as diagrammed in Figure 16, and moves patent acquisition and
licensing activities from mostly ad hoc, independently conducted
activities, to the realm of the strategic.
Second, a centralized group within the Department of Defense’s
senior management level should be created. This newly created
centralized group would utilize FTA to identify and prioritize the
multiple possible technological futures which may emerge beyond
a ten-year time horizon, and additionally, identify the set of possible
corresponding technology roadmaps. This group would then
manage the placement of longer-term strategic U.S. control position
bets along those roadmaps.
Establishing control positions via patents forms an important
part of a multi-part control position strategy. Predicting in advance
317

RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43938, RENEWED GREAT POWER
COMPETITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE–ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Sept. 30,
2020) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3W4-X6DF].
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which specific subset of patent control positions will be the
“winners,” however, can prove challenging. As noted in the
previous paragraph and per the process as drawn in Figure 13, patent
bets are being placed on technologies more than ten years in the
future. As with most bleeding-edge technologies, there exist
multiple competing technology roadmaps; each ostensibly
realizable in the future.318
A successful Innovation Warfare counterstrategy therefore
requires placing patent bets across competing roadmaps, and, over
time, determining which is the most favorable to U.S. interests, and
then leveraging those control positions to make the preferred
roadmap the most likely chosen by both industry and allies. In the
business world this is known as the “beforemath.” Business
professor and author Stan Davis further elaborates:
“Many people,” . . . “wait for events to happen and then they react or
respond to them. When this occurs, people must deal with the aftermath
of the event. But suppose things were turned around. Suppose you
decided what it was that you wanted to occur in the future. If you made
such a decision, and could visualize in your mind’s eye what that future
looked like, then you could manage the events between your present and
your desired future . . . you would decide on the future you wanted to
take place, and then deal with the beforemath of making it happen.”319

In the patent world, sophisticated companies are already
performing these tasks routinely.320 One of the benefits of the
Department of Defense running such a process is that the process
can more easily be executed on a larger scale, for a larger number of
technologies, than one single company can do successfully. The
318
See Yi Zhang, Hongshu Chen & Donghua Zhu, Semi-automatic Technology
Roadmapping Composing Method for Multiple Science, Technology, and
Innovation Data Incorporation, ANTICIPATING FUTURE INNOVATION PATHWAYS
THROUGH LARGE DATA ANALYSIS 13–14 (2016) (surveying existing
methodologies for creating technology roadmaps and noting that such roadmaps
can be created in any of multiple dimensions for a given technology, e.g. time,
policy, market demands; and further noting the previous creation of at least one
multi-dimensional model for China’s solar cell industry.) The Authors’ also
collectively individually each have professional experience in the creation of
technology roadmaps.
319
HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 266, at 155.
320
See id.
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Department of Defense senior leadership process can then be
integrated with the technology transfer function to seed these
emerging technologies into the private sector via one or more of the
licensing methods described above.
Congress has, in fact, requested a subcomponent of this work via
the National Defense Authorization Act.321 Specifically, Section 232
of the Act directs the Department of Defense to establish a process
and policies regarding emerging technologies.322 Emerging
technologies is further defined to mean:
[T]echnology determined to be in an emergent phase of development by
the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for
the analysis of large and diverse sets of data (commonly known as ‘big
data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics,
directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology and such other technology
as may be defined by the Secretary.323

This portion of the Act can be read broadly to include innovation
policies and technology adoption for Innovation Warfare
countermeasures, as well as nonproliferation and classification efforts.
Implementing these organizational changes requires a
significant effort and most importantly, significant top-down
support. As of this writing, within the Department of Defense, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering retains
responsibility for R&D and technology licensing; the Under
Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment retains responsibility for
intellectual property strategy and management of the
congressionally mandated intellectual property cadre of experts; the
Office of General Counsel retains responsibility for filing and
prosecution of patent applications; while responsibility for the
development and utilization of FTA tools remains dispersed.324
321

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 11692 § 232, 133 Stat. 1198 (2019)
322
Id. § 232(a).
323
Id. § 232(d)(2).
324
10 U.S.C. §§ 133a, 133b (defining the roles and responsibilities of the Under
Secretaries of Research and Engineering and of Acquisition and Sustainment
respectively); Id. § 2322 (allocating management of intellectual property matters
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment); Instructions
from Dep’t of Defense, DoD Technology Transfer (T2) Program, at 2 (May 14, 1999),
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Relying on licensing functions, patent acquisition functions, and
strategic decision-making to coordinate across boundaries in a
meaningful and nimble way is challenging.
For this reason, private corporations faced with similar
situations have typically created a senior leadership position to
oversee and manage strategic intellectual property processes. The
Department of Defense should evaluate the creation of a Chief
Intellectual Property Officer (“CIPO”) to facilitate and coordinate
these processes and to ensure that this structure is replicated
throughout each constituent Department.325 The creation of this
position is consistent with Congress’s prior direction that the
Department of Defense maintain a cadre of intellectual property
experts.326 The CIPO position may be either an attorney residing in
the organization’s law department, or a business/management leader
reporting elsewhere. Statutory authority for either architecture exists
within the Department of Defense. For example, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment is tasked in
part with developing sets of intellectual property and licensing
strategies.327 Yet, most patent prosecution takes place within the
Department’s various legal offices, which already put significant
responsibility on the organization’s patent attorneys to develop the
requisite intellectual property control position strategies.
Optionally, a single department, such as, for example, the
Department of the Navy, could be designated as the executive
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/553508p.pdf?ver=
2018-10-22-082514-847 [https://perma.cc/E5WM-ZV8U] (allocating technology
licensing functions to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering); 10
U.S.C. § 140 (describing the duties of General Counsel as chief legal officer and
performs such duties as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe; these duties as
assigned currently include patent prosecution).
325
See 10 U.S.C. § 131(b)(9) (permitting the Secretary of Defense to appoint
“such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Secretary of
Defense may establish or designate in the Office”).
326
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 802. In the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 802(c), Congress
requested an update including a list of the intellectual property experts and their
reporting and leadership structure. Id. § 802(c).
327
10 U.S.C. § 2322(a).
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agency charged with leading these efforts and effectively serving in
the CIPO role.
Figure 16 diagrams the decision architecture and organizational
design described in the preceding paragraphs. Figure 16 shows a
structure and allocation of responsibilities for implementing a whole
of government Innovation Warfare counterstrategy at the highest
levels with a subsequent allocation of responsibilities and tactical
implementation at the agency level. Figure 16 illustrates the
Department of Defense recommendations provided above.

Figure 16. Innovation Warfare Decision and Implementation
Structure

Either organizational structure works. The choice frequently
comes down to who in the organization has the necessary skills to
fill the CIPO role, given that it requires a mix of both highly
advanced business and legal skills. When the role is assigned to the
law department, that department has to recognize the CIPO must
perform non-attorney-client privileged business tasking and has the
authority to make management, not just legal, decisions. When the
role is assigned to a business or managerial unit, the law department
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must recognize that the CIPO must have portfolio oversight and the
authority to direct certain portfolio actions. Based on the Authors’
collective experience, these reorganization and realignment efforts
often require a multi-year implementation window.
Figure 17 diagrams an intellectual property management process
for implementing the Innovation Warfare counterstrategies described
herein. Figure 17 shows one possible organizational design and
process flow wherein the Department of the Navy serves as the
example. The exact implementation may vary by Department or
Agency, however, the basic functional process flow has been found
to constitute a recommended best practice.328
The precise organizational boundaries demarcated in Figure 17
may change but the overall process remains fixed. In all cases,
however, coordination across the many organizational boundaries
requires a designated leader with the appropriate institutional
authority, who is specifically tasked with implementing the control
position and needed intellectual property strategies. In Figure 17, this
leader is shown as the CIPO per the recommendations given above.

Figure 17. One Example of a Department Organizational Design

VIII. CONCLUSION
Innovation Warfare is a competitive strategy prosecuted by
nation states against the innovation infrastructure of the U.S.
328

See HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 266, at 15–17.

256

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 2

Innovation Warfare is a means to a geopolitical end and does not
constitute economic competition as usual. Countries engaging in
Innovation Warfare pose both a national security and economic risk
to the United States because those countries threaten the innovation
ecosystem at the root of economic power and prosperity, and at the
root of military technological superiority.
China is currently prosecuting an Innovation Warfare competitive
strategy against the United States. As documented and described
herein, there currently exists a comprehensive, coordinated effort by
China to acquire U.S. technology and to co-opt the U.S. innovation
base for its own purposes. A future in which China prevails in the
Innovation Warfare “fight” is one in which the United States cedes the
technological future to another, and one in which its geopolitical power
and the prosperity of its citizens is at risk. The danger presented by
China’s Innovation Warfare tactics is also an existential one.
A technological future dictated by Chinese interests is unlikely
to incorporate western values of privacy and personal liberties into
that technology. Innovation Warfare thus constitutes a threat against
which the United States must defend itself. Development and
execution of an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy are therefore
critical to protecting the national security and economic interests of
the United States and negating the type of economic and geopolitical
aggression that previously led to two World Wars. Executing a
counterstrategy not only preserves the peace but ensures that peace
is one in which American welfare and liberties remain intact. There
are four things the United States must do to execute an effective
counterstrategy. These four things are:
1) Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Develop machine
learning tools to identify the possible technological futures
and drive towards the preferred future(s);
2) Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and scope
federal R&D spending to seed the innovations necessary to
attain the preferred future(s);
3) Secure Technology Control Positions – Identify and secure
control positions along the preferred future technology
implementation path, including deploying and protecting

DEC. 2020]

Innovation Warfare

257

intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation
Warfare battlespace; and
4) Organize to Win – Develop the cross-functional capabilities
and inter-organizational coordination both within the
government and across the public-private interface.
Innovation Warfare distilled down to its most basic truth is a
footrace to control the technological future. FTA capabilities are
thus vital not just to winning, but also to defining the mileposts along
the racecourse. Future investments in FTA capabilities will be
critical to overtake the lead others have built in this field. One cannot
influence the attainment of a future one cannot see, or which others
can see well in advance. In a world where others have advanced FTA
capabilities, it will be difficult to optimize research into new
technologies with equivalent speed and insightfulness absent those
investments.
The capabilities necessary to implement the remaining elements
of the Innovation Warfare counterstrategy already exist but must be
marshalled and aligned with strategic goals. In particular, the
government, and specifically the Department of Defense, should
work to expand its intellectual property portfolios and align them
with Innovation Warfare objectives. Intellectual property constitutes
a crucial armament in the Innovation Warfare battlespace.
Intellectual property establishes control positions along the
racecourse to the technological future(s). According to the
principles of strategic openness, these control positions can be gated
open to encourage technology adoption, or gated closed to prevent
it. Deft use of advanced licensing techniques employs these principles
to manage the established control positions and ensures that the
technological future arrived at is the one preferred.
Each of these enumerated counterstrategy elements stands not
alone but works in concert with the others. Leadership must
organize nationally and at the agency levels to synchronize these
efforts. Agencies with strong research portfolios, such as the
Department of Defense and Department of Energy, will require a
designated leader or function to coordinate the intellectual property
and control position aspects of the counterstrategy across various
internal stakeholders. This functionality can be achieved by
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appointing a CIPO or by expanding the responsibilities of existing
personnel. Within the Department of Defense, it may additionally be
possible to designate one department, for example, the Navy, as the
lead executive agency with overall responsibility for implementing the
counterstrategy. Sufficient statutory authority exists to execute the
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy and organizational design, without
the need for additional legislation or rulemaking.
Innovation Warfare may exist in the gray area between peace
and war, but it nonetheless is a conflict the United States must win.

